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ARTICLE
ALTERNATIVES TO CHALLENGED EMPLOYEE
SELECTION CRITERIA: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
NONSTATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISPARATE IMPACT
CASES UNDER TITLE VII
JULIA LAMBER*
In contrast to most recent commentary and a superficial reading of Supreme
Court cases, Professor Lamber rehabilitates the concept of a distinct disparate
impact theory under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. She examines one
important evidentiary question-the significance of alternative employee section
criteria-to expose underlying policy questions often buried in technical questionsof
form. Others have argued that the Supreme Court's apparent analytical and
evidentiary alignment of disparate impact and disparate treatment cases shows that
Title VII bars only "intentional discrimination" and thus the purpose of alternatives
evidence is quite limited. Professor Lamber presents a different view, arguing that a
proper understanding of the Court's Title VII decisions and of the specific interests
employers assert to justify criteria demonstrates that using alternatives to evaluate
these justifications need not impose undue burdens on employers. Identifying typical
fact patterns in Title VII litigation, she then illustrates three ways in which
alternatives evidence can be relevant. Professor Lamber concludes that the utility of
alternatives evidence depends on the kind of selection criterion challenged and the
employer's reason for using it.
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 represents an unequivo-
cal Congressional commitment to eliminate discrimination in the work-
place. That commitment is not, however, unambiguous. Although the
legislation has been in place for only twenty years, it has spawned an
enormous number of cases, involving considerable money and emo-
tion. Despite the wealth of litigation, no consensus has yet emerged on
the appropriate balance of the competing interests of employers and
employees. Many discrimination cases turn on evidentiary questions
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington). B.A., 1969, DePauw
University; J.D., 1972, Indiana University (Bloomington). I would like to thank Terry Bethel,
William Popkin, Elaine Shoben, Eileen Silverstein, and Michael Sinclair for their helpful
suggestions, and Becky Frederick, J.D., 1983, for her able research assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1982)).
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or, even more formalistically, on the right order of proof, but few focus
in any systematic way on the significance of the evidence. This Article
examines an evidentiary question important in Title VII cases-the sig-
nificance of alternative employee selection criteria-and confronts the
policy questions underlying usage of alternatives evidence that Con-
gress, the courts, and society have not resolved. Although this examina-
tion will not, by itself, settle the balance of competing interests under
Title VII, it will assist that larger debate.
Under the prevailing view, showing the existence of alternative em-
ployee selection criteria only aids in determining whether there is inten-
tional discrimination.2 Most commentary and a superficial reading of
Supreme Court decisions suggest that employees alleging discrimina-
tion must show that alternative selection criteria are so superior to the
existing criteria that a court can infer discriminatory motivation from
an employer's failure to adopt them. Further, the literature typically
assumes that alternatives are relevant only after the defendant has satis-
fied its burden of justification. This view is based on the combined effect
of several Supreme Court Title VII cases and is linked with the view
that Title VII only prohibits what can be characterized as intentional
discrimination.
This Article argues that the utility of establishing alternatives has
been misunderstood and that such proof should not be so limited in
time or purpose. A proper understanding of the Supreme Court's Title
VII decisions and of the specific interest that employers assert as justify-
ing a selection criterion demonstrates that using alternatives to evaluate
this justification need not impose an undue burden on the employer.
This Article suggests an approach for determining when and how evi-
dence of alternative selection criteria is relevant in disparate impact
claims under Title VII. 3 The significance of alternatives evidence and
2. Booth & MacKay, Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in
the Law, 29 EMORY L.J. 121 (1980); Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after Beazer and Burdine, 23
B.C.L. REV. 419 (1982); Maltz, The Expansion of the Role of the Effects Text in Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Analysis, 59 NEB. L. REV. 345 (1980); Smith, Employer Defenses in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens of Proof and Substantive Standards Follow-
ing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372 (1982); Thompson & Chris-
tiansen, Court Acceptance of Uniform Guidelines Provisions: The Bottom Line and the Search for
Alternatives, 8 EMPL. REL. L.J. 587 (1983); Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-
Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 911 (1979). See also Note, Business Necessity:
Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Ga. Note]; Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case Under Title VII: Limiting Judicial
Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 [hereinafter cited as I11. Note].
3. The Supreme Court has recognized two theories of liability under Title VII, termed
"disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). Describing disparate treatment as the most easily understood type
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the appropriate time to consider such evidence are not merely technical
questions for the litigant, although they can, in effect, decide the case.
More importantly, they raise fundamental issues about the relevance of
motivation in Title VII litigation, about the intrusion on an employer's
autonomy tolerated in order to eliminate unintended discrimination,
and about the commitment of the Supreme Court to its original dispa-
rate impact decision.
The Supreme Court enunciated the disparate impact theory of lia-
bility in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,4 its first substantive interpre-
tation of Title VII. In addition to defining discrimination to include
neutral policies not intended or consciously used to discriminate, the
Court recognized the employer's right to promulgate policies regardless
of their adverse impact if the policies genuinely supported legitimate
business interests. Although the Court did not fully explain what poli-
cies might be legitimate, it stated that "any test used must measure the
person for the job and not the person in the abstract." 5
The Court's second disparate impact case was Albemarle Paper
Company v. Moody,6 in which the Court addressed more specifically the
employer's burden of justifying pre-employment tests with an adverse
impact. Relying extensively on the then existing Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) testing guidelines," the Supreme
Court concluded that the employer's "validation" attempt was "mate-
rially defective" in several respects. 8 Remanding the case to the district
of discrimination, the Supreme Court has defined the claim as one in which the defendant inten-
tionally treats some people less favorably than others because of their race or gender. Id. Proof of
discriminatory motivation is critical although motive can sometimes be inferred from evidence
showing differences in treatment along race or gender lines. "Disparate impact" claims involve
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. In
contrast to disparate treatment claims, the disparate impact theory of liability does not require
proof of discriminatory motivation. Id.
Some aspects of the disparate impact theory of liability are well-settled. There is general
agreement on the order and allocation of proof. The plaintiff must show that an employment
policy has substantial adverse impact on protected groups. If the defendant chooses not to rebut
this evidence of adverse impact, it must justify the use of the employment policy. Most courts agree
that defendants bear the burden of persuasion, not simply production, on this issue, but do not
agree about the substance of the defendant's burden. Most courts have decided that plaintiffs bear
the burden on any argument concerning the existence of alternatives to the challenged policy. That
is, the plaintiff must identify alternatives with less adverse impact and must persuade the court that
they serve the employer's purposes equally well.
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5. Id. at 436.
6. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
7. Id. at 431, relying on EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 35 Fed.
Reg. 12,333 (1970) (revised version codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1984)).
8. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431-35. While "validation" is a technical and complex sub-
ject, the basic notion is straightforward. In essence, a validation study empirically shows a rela-
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court because the appropriate standard for proving "job-relatedness"
had previously not been clear,9 the Court wrote:
If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its
tests are "job related," it remains open to the complaining
party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a
similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in "efficient and trustworthy work-
manship." . . . Such a showing would be evidence that the
employer was using its tests merely as a "pretext" for discrimi-
nation. 0
Thus, if the defendant were to establish that its testing program was
job-related, the plaintiffs would still have the opportunity to show that,
given alternative procedures, the defendant chose the challenged tests
as a way to continue excluding blacks from all-white jobs.
Although the Court's decision was reasonable in the factual con-
text of Albemarle," the question remains whether the Court meant to
tionship between performance on a test and performance on the job. See infra text accompanying
notes 161-72. See also infra note 173.
9. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 436.
10. Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
This approach was originally suggested by Developments in the Law-Employment Discrim-
ination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1118-19 (1971), written
before the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs. The suggested scheme for allocating burdens of
proof and persuasion states that if the "plaintiff can show that an equally good predictor of job
performance exists that does not have as substantial an effect on minority employment, the court
then should require the company to substitute this new predictor for the one it is using." Id. Unfor-
tunately, the Harvard article does not say why.
The article is also unclear in its conceptualization of disparate impact. For example, in one
place it discusses the inferences to be drawn from a rule with an adverse impact, suggesting that
impact is evidence of intentional discrimination, Id. at 1151; in another it discusses the value of the
job-relatedness standard without reference to any evidence of past discrimination or pretext, sug-
gesting disparate impact is a separate conceptual theory of discrimination, id. at 1116-28. For a
more general discussion of the difference between adverse impact as evidence of intentional dis-
crimination and adverse impact as a theory of recovery, see Lamber, Reskin & Dworkin, The
Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553 (1983).
11. This allocation of proof makes sense because the validation requirements of the
EEOC testing guidelines are quite stringent and include investigation of suitable alternatives with
less adverse impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1984). To the extent that the employer satisfies this
obligation, the plaintiffs most obvious argument in rebuttal is that, notwithstanding the statistical
connection between the tests and job performance, the testing program masks racial
discrimination.
At the time Albemarle was decided, EEOC had its own guidelines on employee testing pro-
cedures. In 1978, the four federal civil rights enforcement agencies (Departments of Justice and
Labor, EEOC, and the Civil Service Commission) promulgated the Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1984))
[hereinafter cited as Uniform Guidelines]. The provision concerning investigation of alternatives is
substantially the same in both guidelines. See id. at § 3B. The agencies assert that imposing this
obligation is not inconsistent with Albemarle. See Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify
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exclude the use of alternatives evidence for purposes other than show-
ing "pretext." There is nothing in the opinion to suggest that it did. 2 In
fact, the Supreme Court has never explained how proof of discrimina-
tory motivation applies to disparate impact cases; nor has the Court
said that evidence of less discriminatory alternatives is relevant only to
establish such motivation. In three subsequent decisions, the Court has
reiterated that the plaintiff has the burden of proving alternatives and
twice has said that the purpose is to prove intentional discrimination.'"
But, "none of the relevant decisions has focused upon this apparent
inconsistency" of imposing an intent element in a case where intent is
not at issue. '4
The simple answer to the question of how discriminatory motiva-
tion is important in disparate impact cases may be that intention is al-
ways an important factor in a discrimination case.' 5 Albemarle's dis-
cussion of alternatives may suggest only that a plaintiff is not precluded
from bringing the intention of the defendant into issue in a disparate
impact case. By raising the possibility of pretext, the Court stated what
was already understood to be true: a plaintiff can raise both intentional
and unintentional claims in the same lawsuit and with respect to the
same selection criterion.1 6 If this answer is the reason that discrimina-
tory motivation is a factor in disparate impact cases, nothing the Court
said in Albemarle about the purpose of alternatives evidence or the in-
tent standard limits the relevance of alternatives evidence when discrim-
inatory motivation is not at issue.
Nor has the Supreme Court said that alternatives may only be con-
sidered after the defendant has met its burden ofjustification. Although
and Provide a Common Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11,996, 12,003 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Guidelines: Questions and
Answers].
12. The above-quoted part of the opinion does little more than raise questions. Why, for
example, did the Court say the defendant's motivation is relevant to a claim notable for not requir-
ing proof of impermissible motivation? Why did the Court burden the plaintiff on an issue that
seems logically part of the defendant's justification? Why did the Court raise the question of alter-
natives when the issue was not necessary to the resolution of the case? There is nothing in the
record to suggest that the parties argued the issue or that the Court specifically focused on it. Nor
has the Court returned to the issue in subsequent cases.
13. The Court did not mention pretext in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
The other disparate impact cases are New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979)
and Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
14. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protec-
tion with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 694 (1981).
15. Cf Furnish, supra note 2, at 423; Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under
Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV.
305, 322-23 (1983).
16. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION 30-33 (1980). See also Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
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in Albemarle the Court said that the plaintiffs' opportunity to show that
alternatives were available arises after the defendant meets its burden of
justification, it did not say that evidence of alternatives could be raised
only by rebuttal. More importantly, the Court did not attempt to justify
any such limitation. Actual litigation might not proceed in as rigid a
fashion as the Court's discussion would suggest. Instead, the plaintiff
may introduce all its evidence in its case in chief before the defendant
proceeds.' 7 The important issue is what to make of the evidence, not
when is it presented. 8
This Article illustrates three ways in which evidence of workable
alternatives can be relevant. First, such evidence may support an infer-
ence of intentional discrimination, as the Court in Albemarle said, al-
though the plaintiff probably would also have to show that the defen-
dant knew of the alternatives.19 This use of alternatives evidence is
uncommon, but it is not controversial. Second, such evidence may illus-
trate that the relationship between the selection criterion and the em-
ployer's purpose is not substantial enough to justify use of that crite-
rion. This use of alternatives evidence ought to be noncontroversial
because it merely tests whether an asserted relationship in fact exists.
17. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 16, at 59, 65.
18. The significance of the proof ought to determine when it is presented, not vice versa.
Even if alternatives may only be presented in rebuttal, this order need not limit the probative value
of the evidence. Cf Smith, supra note 2, at 403-04 (under Albemarle's framework, alternatives
must be limited to impermissible motive issue; otherwise the defendant runs the risk of having its
defense deemed unproven simply because the plaintiff proves there are alternatives). See also
Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural
Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1273-74 (1981) (rebuttal should be eliminated because it is
redundant).
The lower courts that have considered the question do not agree about the significance of
establishing the existence of alternative selection procedures. There are, however, surprisingly few
decisions that focus on the issue. Some courts merely repeat Albemarle's conclusion that alterna-
tives are to prove pretext. Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992-94 (5th Cir. 1982).
Others reject proffered alternatives because they are not feasible or do not adequately serve the
same interest of the employer; none of these courts reach the question of the significance of alterna-
tives. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1285 (9th Cir. 1981). Still others consider
alternatives, or suggest factors a court should consider in assessing whether there are "acceptable
alternatives," but simply assume the evidence is relevant in some unspecified way. Chrisner v.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th Cir. 1981). Finally, other courts consider
evidence of alternatives as providing an opportunity to scrutinize more rigorously the necessity of
the employer's selection procedure, but they seldom discuss the apparent inconsistency with the
Court's decision in Albemarle. Parson v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1389 (5th
Cir. 1978); Allen v. City of Mobile, 464 F. Supp. 433, 440-41 (S.D. Ala. 1978).
19. Thompson & Christiansen, supra note 2, at 598. In order to infer intentional discrim-
ination in similar situations under the Constitution, the plaintiff would need to show the defendant
knew of the alternatives and rejected them because the defendant subjectively desired the adverse
impact. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256 (1979). Neither the applicability of
Feeney to Title VII nor the definition of intentional discrimination under Title VII is clear. C.
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 16, at 18-22.
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Third, evidence of alternatives may suggest that the employer's interest
in using a particular selection criterion is not sufficiently important if
other selection criteria would accomplish the same goal. This use is con-
troversial because it intrudes upon the employer's autonomy to struc-
ture its selection process.
Using alternatives in these ways will, of course, require courts to
evaluate decisions made by employers. Courts may be reluctant to do
so because such evaluations seem beyond judicial competence and are
likely to cause broad debate.2" Recognizing the relevance of alterna-
tives to evaluate the adequacy of an employer's justification does not,
however, call for substituting judicial judgments for management au-
thority over a broad range of decisions. Instead, with evidence of alter-
natives, the plaintiff asks the court to evaluate whether a specific busi-
ness judgment was made in accordance with statutory standards. 21
Part I of this Article summarizes the argument for limiting evi-
dence of alternatives to proving intentional discrimination at the rebut-
tal stage and provides a detailed critique of that argument. Part II'de-
scribes a functional approach for judging the utility of evidence of
alternatives after reviewing the nature of the defendant's burden of
proof. It identifies three typical factual patterns under the disparate im-
pact theory. First, plaintiffs challenge a paper and pencil test that
defendants say is a valid predictor of successful job performance. Sec-
20. This larger debate concerns the role of federal judges given far-reaching changes in
the nature and form of judicial business. Compare Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-For-
ward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (1982) (judges cannot
escape the painful necessity of policy choice by claiming that in sustaining official action judges are
exhibiting appropriate deference to other decisionmakers and, as a result, cannot be held responsi-
ble for policy decisions made elsewhere) with Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superin-
tending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 106 (1979) (there are unprece-
dented pressures on judges to abandon their historical position as neutral arbiters and to assume
the manipulative role of power brokers; the efficacy of this role can be sustained only by transform-
ing the popular view of the judiciary). See also 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); D.
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 715 (1978).
21. This sort of practice is familiar to the law. For example, the Supreme Court contin-
ues to stress the National Labor Relations Board's duty to balance an employer's management
prerogatives against the statutory rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively. See,
e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505-06 (1978) (Court upheld NLRB decision to
allow employees to organize on company property notwithstanding management's objections that
such activity would disrupt health care operations and disturb patients). And recently, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Bankruptcy Code to permit an employer's unilateral rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement, but only if the bankruptcy court makes an independent judgment
that rejecting the labor contract serves a successful reorganization. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984) (Court made clear that the bankruptcy court's function was to scrutinize the
decision to reject the labor contract in contrast to the more general "business judgment"
standard).
1985:1
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
ond, plaintiffs challenge a nonscored, objective criterion that defend-
ants assert is related to successful job performance. And, third, plain-
tiffs challenge a nonscored, objective criterion that defendants argue is
important for reasons unrelated to job performance, such as economic
or political self-interest. These patterns illustrate that the utility of alter-
natives evidence depends on a proper understanding of the specific in-
terest the employer asserts as justifying the challenged criteria.2" In
Part III the Article concludes with an examination of several recent
court of appeals decisions to illustrate, in light of the proposed func-
tional approach, the vitality and consistency of the disparate impact
theory of discrimination.
I. A REASSESSMENT OF SOME COMMON NOTIONS AND AN ALTERNATIVE
The prevailing view is that alternatives evidence is limited to prov-
ing intentional discrimination at the rebuttal stage in a disparate impact
case. This view is based on two arguments. First, the Supreme Court's
decisions analyze both disparate impact and intentional discrimination
cases within an increasingly similar framework which should be en-
couraged rather than resisted. Second, the employer's burden of justify-
ing a selection criterion with an adverse impact is a limited one and
using alternatives to evaluate the adequacy of this justification implies
an undesirable shift in the relative burdens of proof.
The contrary view-that alternatives evidence can show much
more than simply intentional discrimination-is based on a recognition
of disparate impact and disparate treatment as two fundamentally dif-
ferent theories of liability. The Supreme Court never has waivered in its
understanding that a showing of intent is not required to prevail in a
disparate impact case. From Griggs to Connecticut v. Teal, the Court
has stressed that disparate impact is a separate and complete claim
under Title VII. Furthermore, nothing in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions is intended to limit the utility of alternatives evidence. This view of
the Supreme Court's decisions not only provides the doctrinal rationale
for the functional analysis that follows in Part II but also highlights the
policy questions often buried in technical discussions of burdens of
proof.
This Part looks at the Supreme Court's relatively few substantive
decisions under Title VII, but not in simple chronological order. Sec-
tion A confronts the application of the disparate treatment analytical
22. These three fact patterns are not an exhaustive catalogue of disparate impact allega-
tions, but rather illustrate the issues raised in this article concerning the nature of the defendant's
burden of proof and the relevance of evidence of alternatives. These patterns are also illustrations
where the applicability of the disparate impact theory is not in question.
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framework to disparate impact claims and concludes that analytical
and evidentiary similarities exist only when there are functional similar-
ities between the two theories. Section B presents the Court's problem-
atic opinion in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, questioning
a common reading of Beazer that places it in direct contradiction to the
Court's statements, both before and after Beazer, that disparate impact
does not require a showing of intent. Finally, Section C reviews two
other Supreme Court decisions that support the view that the utility of
alternatives evidence is not limited to showing intentional discrimina-
tion and that reaffirm the conceptual distinction between the theories of
liability under Title VII.
A. The Symmhetry of the Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment
Theories
In describing the analytical framework for disparate impact cases
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Supreme Court borrowed from
an earlier decision involving an allegation of intentional discrimination
against an individual.23 In that case, McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 4 the
Court set out a three-step approach for analyzing such claims. First, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by
eliminating the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for rejection
and thus supporting an inference that the employer intentionally dis-
criminated on the basis of race.2" Second, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to rebut this inference by "articulat[ing] some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the plaintiff's rejection.26 The defen-
dant's burden is simply to produce sufficient evidence to raise an issue
of fact, not to persuade the court. Third, if the defendant carries this
burden of production, the plaintiff then has the "opportunity to show
that [the employer's] stated reason for rejection was in fact pretext." 27
Thus, the plaintiff still has the opportunity to demonstrate that,
whatever the stated reasons, the decision was in reality racially
premised.28
23. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)).
24. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
25. Id. at 802. The plaintiff's prima facie case is established by showing that he belonged
to a racial minority, that he applied and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking
applicants, that he was rejected despite his qualifications, and that after his rejection the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 804.
28. Id. at 805 n.18.
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Following the analytical framework set out in McDonnell Douglas,
the Court in Albemarle described the issue at the rebuttal stage of a
disparate impact case also as one of "pretext." This analysis suggests
some symmetry between the disparate impact and intentional discrimi-
nation theories in terms of their order and nature of proof. A claim
under either theory proceeds with the three-step approach: the plain-
tiff's prima facie case, the defendant's response, and then the plaintiff's
rebuttal. And, under either theory, the issue at the rebuttal stage is de-
scribed as whether the plaintiff's evidence establishes "pretext."
Subsequent Supreme Court cases sometimes are read to affirm this
symmetrical analysis for disparate impact and intentional discrimina-
tion claims. 29 Moreover, these subsequent cases arguably support the
view that evidence of alternatives is relevant only to show pretext, not
to evaluate the adequacy of the defendant's justification. The better
view, however, is that the interpretations and limitations of proving
intentional discrimination do not necessarily apply to disparate impact
cases. Uniformity in the order and allocation of proof for the two theo-
ries is desirable only if the procedures do not mask real differences; and
crucial differences do exist. Arguments advanced in disparate impact
claims are fundamentally different from those advanced in disparate
treatment claims, so the burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases
should not determine the burdens in disparate impact cases.
1. THE BROAD VIEW OF FURNCO AND SWEENEY
In Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,3" the Court considered the
relevance of alternative hiring practices that would have enabled the
employer to consider more minority group applicants. The plaintiffs,
three black bricklayers, challenged the hiring practices of Furnco, a ma-
son contractor. Furnco did not have its own work force; for each con-
tract, it hired a job superintendent and the superintendent in turn hired
bricklayers in whom he had confidence. Bricklayers were not hired at
the job site, nor were applications taken from those who came to the job
site. The job superintendent hired principally from an existing list of
bricklayers, all white, with whom the superintendent had worked. This
list was supplemented by the names of a few black bricklayers obtained
from other sources. 3'
29. E.g., Furnish, supra note 2, at 423-25; Ga. Note, supra note 2, at 408.
30. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
31. The reason for this "affirmative" action, according to the court of appeals, Waters v.
Furnco Construction Co., 551 F.2d 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1977), was Furnco's involvement in an-
other case involving racial discrimination. The general manager suggested hiring the plaintiffs in
the other case.
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The plaintiffs alleged that Furnco violated Title VII under both the
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, but the district court
found in favor of the defendants. The court of appeals reversed, holding
in favor of the plaintiffs' disparate treatment claim. The Supreme Court
then reversed this determination because the court of appeals had
placed too heavy a burden on the defendants to rebut the disparate
treatment prima facie case.
Reaffirming the three-step approach of McDonnell Douglas, the
Court explained that the plaintiffs' evidence established a prima facie
case "only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible fac-
tors." 3 When the prima facie case is understood in this light, the Court
continued, "it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer
is merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a
legitimate consideration."3 3 The employer was not required to prove
that his employment practices allowed him to consider the most minor-
ity employment applications. According to the Court, Title VII did
"not impose a duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring
of minority employees." 34
Applying Furnco's holding to the issue of alternatives in disparate
impact cases, proponents of the limited use of alternatives evidence
would argue that the failure to consider alternatives should never affect
the adequacy of the defendant's justification. Because Title VII does not
impose a duty on the defendant to maximize the hiring of minority em-
ployees, the defendant's justification cannot be measured against this
maximization standard. Thus, if alternatives are relevant at all, their
existence can only go to prove intentional discrimination on the part of
the defendant in choosing the challenged selection criterion over
another.
Employers can take the Furnco holding one step further and argue
that the existence of less discriminatory alternatives is irrelevant at any
stage of liability analysis. If the employer need not maximize the hiring
of minority employees, it makes no difference that another selection
criterion would serve the employer's interest equally well with less dis-
criminatory impact.35 That is, no inference of intentional discrimina-
tion may be drawn from the failure to choose an alternative criterion.
The view that evidence of alternatives should not affect the ade-
quacy of the defendant's justification finds further support in Board of
32. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 577-78.
35. See Booth & MacKay, supra note 2, at 191-92.
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Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney. 36 The Supreme Court re-
manded this case to the court of appeals because again, according to the
Court, the court of appeals had misunderstood the nature of the evi-
dence necessary to rebut a prima facie case of intentional discrimina-
tion against an individual. Sweeney alleged that Keene State College
had denied her promotion to professor because of her sex. The court of
appeals, affirming the district court's decision in her favor, rejected the
defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. In
discussing the order and nature of proof in a disparate treatment case,
the court said that the defendant's burden was to offer evidence that
"some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason accounted for its ac-
tions."37 The court also stated, however, that the defendant was re-
quired "to prove absence of discriminatory motive."' 38 In a per curiam
decision by five justices, the Supreme Court remanded the case because
it could not tell which of the two conflicting standards the court of ap-
peals had applied and because of the implication in the lower court's
opinion that there is no difference between the two standards.39 Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court majority, articulating a nondiscrimina-
tory reason suffices to meet a prima facie case of individual disparate
treatment.
Proponents of the limited use of alternatives evidence often rely on
Sweeney's rationale to support their view.4" In discussing the difference
between "articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" and
"proving the absence of discriminatory motive," the Supreme Court
noted that the latter "would make entirely superfluous the third step in
the Furnco-McDonnell Douglas analysis, since it would place on the em-
ployer at the second stage the burden of showing that the reason for
rejection was not a pretext, rather than requiring contrary proof from
the employee as a part of the third step."41 Applied to disparate impact
cases, this rationale suggests that considering alternatives to evaluate
the defendant's justification would make the rebuttal stage in Albemarle
similarly superfluous.
Proponents of the limited use of alternatives evidence also rely on
Sweeney's distinction between affirming a nondiscriminatory motive
36. 439 U.S. 24 (1979).
37. Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir.
1978).
38. Id.
39. Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 24 n.l.
40. Booth & MacKay, supra note 2, at 192; Furnish, supra note 2, at 436; Thompson &
Christiansen, supra note 2, at 600. See also Ga. Note, supra note 2, at 409 n.172.
41. Id. The third step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis is the plaintiff's opportunity to
show that the stated reasons are a pretext.
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and negating a discriminatory one.4" Proving the existence of a good
motive does not necessarily negate the existence of an improper one.
43
The same distinction applies in the context of alternatives in disparate
impact cases. Proving that an employment policy is related to job per-
formance and even that some alternatives do not adequately predict job
performance does not necessarily mean acceptable alternatives are un-
available. Considering alternatives to evaluate the defendant's justifica-
tion not only makes Albemarle's rebuttal stage superfluous, it also im-
plicitly places on the defendant the nearly impossible burden of proving
the absence of less discriminatory alternatives. Proving the existence of
a negative is difficult and Sweeney does not require it of defendants in
disparate treatment cases. Similarly, defendants in disparate impact
cases should not be required to bear this impossible burden.
2. LIMITATIONS OF FURNCO AND SWEENEY
Although some commentators have argued in favor of a unitary
analysis for discrimination cases under Title VII, 44 the analytical
42. The Sweeney dissenters argued that the McDonnell Douglas standard raised two
questions: whether the defendant had to prove or merely state its argument and whether the argu-
ment could be a legitimate reason or had to disprove a discriminatory reason. The dissent also
argued that there was no need for a remand in Sweeney because, whatever the potential confusion,
the defendant's burden was not really at issue. The court of appeals' subsequent decision, Sweeney
v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979), reaffirming the district
court's judgment for the plaintiff, supports the dissent's view of the merits of the case. The
Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981), makes clear that the defendant's burden in rebutting a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination is one of production, not persuasion.
43. The question of mixed motives arises in non-Title VII cases as well. In Mount
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the Supreme Court held that
the burden was on school officials to show that a teacher who had been fired in violation of his first
amendment rights would have been fired even in the absence of that reason. In NLRB v. Transpor-
tation Mgmt. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983), the Court upheld the NLRB's "Wright Line" rule for
evaluating dual motive discharges under which the employer can avoid a finding of an unfair labor
practice if it proves that the discharge would have occurred in any event and was for valid reasons.
Thus, the Court recognizes both proper and improper motives can co-exist; the question is
whether the adverse action would have occurred without the impermissible motive. See also Vil-
lage of Arlington Hts. v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (factors to consider
in evaluating motive). For a discussion of the policies underlying mixed motive decisions, see
Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspec-
tive, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982); Jackson & Heller, The Irrelevance of the Wright Line Debate:
Returning to the Realism of Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 737
(1983).
44. E.g., Booth & MacKay, supra note 2, at 191 n.271 (the holdings of Furnco and
Sweeney should be equally applicable in disparate impact cases, but the authors do not explain
why); Note, Proving Title VII Sex-Based Wage Discrimination after County of Washington v.
Gunther, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 281, 306 n. 124 (1983) (the Supreme Court frequently relies on dispa-
rate treatment cases to determine the burden of proof in disparate impact cases). See also Furnish,
supra note 2, at 440; Ga. Note, supra note 2, at 419.
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frameworks, and thus burdens of proof, are different for disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment claims. Furnco and Sweeney were ana-
lyzed appropriately as disparate treatment cases. But, the issue in these
cases-whether the defendant made a race- or gender-based decision-
is fundamentally different from the issues raised by a disparate impact
claim. In a disparate impact claim the issues are whether a facially neu-
tral rule falls more harshly on minority group members and whether
use of the rule is unjustified. Additionally, the plaintiff's evidence in a
disparate treatment case usually is circumstantial, supporting the infer-
ence that the employment decision was in fact based on race or gender.
In contrast, the plaintiff's evidence in a disparate impact case is most
often direct evidence that a selection criterion disqualifies proportion-
ally more blacks than whites, or more women than men. In either case
the evidentiary burden, which shifts to the defendant, is determined by
the nature of its defense.
Theoretically, the defendant has at least two choices under either
theory: the defendant may either deny the allegation or seek to justify
its actions. In disparate treatment cases such as Furnco, the employer
denies the claim that racial considerations motivated its hiring decisions
by offering some nonracial reason for its decisions. Thus, the defendant
meets the plaintiff's prima facie case by offering some reason for not
drawing the inference suggested by the plaintiffs evidence. The Court's
unanimous opinion in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine makes clear that evidence of any lawful reason will suffice to
rebut this inference.45 With disparate treatment claims such as in
Dothard v. Rawlinson,46 in which the plaintiffs challenged a state regu-
lation excluding women as prison guards, the defendant chose the sec-
ond approach. The state admitted that the regulation intentionally dis-
criminated but justified the gender distinction under Title VII's "bona
fide occupational qualification" (bfoq) provision.4"
The defendant can also attack a plaintiffs disparate impact claim
in two ways. First, the defendant may deny that the rule has a meaning-
ful adverse impact on the minority group in question by challenging the
accuracy or significance of the plaintiffs statistical evidence or by argu-
ing that the selection procedure is not the cause of any adverse im-
45. 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981). The Court also said that the stated reason must be clear
and reasonably specific and set forth through admissible evidence. See also infra note 84.
46. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). The bfoq exception, which allows employers to dis-
criminate if it is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise," is a narrow one and available only for discrimination based on sex, religion, or na-
tional origin-not race.
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pact.4" Second, the defendant may admit the existence of the disparity
and the causal effect of the rule yet seek to justify the use of the selection
criterion. Only when the defendant seeks to justify the rule does the
issue arise concerning the relation of the rule to job performance or to
other legitimate business considerations.
Thus, Furnco and Sweeney concerned issues fundamentally differ-
ent from those raised by the later stages of proof in disparate impact
claims. Denying a claim, as the defendants did in Furnco and Sweeney,
is analytically different, and risks different consequences, than seeking
to justify one's actions. And denying a claim of intentional discrimina-
tion differs even more from justifying a rule with an adverse impact
when good faith is not at issue. Because the defendant advances differ-
ent arguments in the two situations, it makes no sense to make the sub-
stance of proof the same for all disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment cases.4 9 The defendant's burden in disparate treatment cases,
therefore, should not determine the defendant's burden in disparate im-
pact cases.
Similarly, the Court's rationale in Furnco and Sweeney should not
be extended to disparate impact cases in determining the relevance and
purpose of alternatives evidence. The plaintiffs in Furnco alleged that
the defendant made hiring decisions on the basis of race. The Supreme
Court agreed with the court of appeals that the plaintiffs had estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas v.
Green. In addition to proving that they had done everything within
their power to apply for employment and that they were qualified, the
plaintiffs introduced evidence of past exclusions and of the failure of the
employer to take applications for employment.5" To rebut this infer-
ence of intentional racial discrimination, the defendant did not have to
prove that it "pursued the course which would. . . allow him to con-
sider the most employment applications."" The Court said that Title
VII "does not impose a duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maxi-
mizes hiring of minority employees"52 in order to dispel the adverse
inference that the hiring decisions were made on the basis of race. Even
here, however, the Court did not preclude the consideration of alterna-
tive hiring practices altogether. Plaintiffs still may argue that the failure
48. These difficult questions are often litigated, and are discussed elsewhere. Compare
Lamber, Reskin & Dworkin, supra note 10, with Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employ-
ment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1978). See also D. BALDUS
& J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980); Comment, Judicial Refinement of Statis-
tical Evidence in Title VII Cases, 13 CONN. L. REV. 515 (1981).
49. Smith, supra note 2, at 392-94.
50. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 570-71.
51. Id. at 577.
52. Id. at 577-78.
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to adopt a different, more open hiring practice, such as taking applica-
tions or hiring at the job site, is some evidence that the defendant's
"legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" is in fact a pretext for discrimi-
nation.5 3 For example, an employer's practice of taking no applica-
tions and hiring graduates only from Goldsboro Christian College54
would be compelling evidence that the employer intended to hire only
whites. 55
The Court's decision in Furnco did not say that the existence of
alternative hiring practices is irrelevant. It did not say that under Title
VII an employer is never required to change its hiring practices with the
effect that a new procedure would maximize hiring minority employees.
Instead, the Court said only that proving the unavailability of alterna-
tive, minority-maximizing hiring practices is not part of the defendant's
burden in rebutting an inference of intentional discrimination based on
circumstantial evidence. 5 6
In contrast, in a disparate impact case, the question of alternatives
arises only after the plaintiff has established the adverse effect of a selec-
tion criterion, his prima facie case. Evidence of workable alternatives
can then serve to undermine the defendant's attempt to justify the crite-
rion. The existence of alternatives could suggest that the selection crite-
rion is not sufficiently related to the employer's stated goal or that the
employer's interest advanced by a particular selection criterion is rela-
53. Id. at 578. The Court's opinion allows this possibility, although such evidence was
not sufficient to prove pretext in this case. See Waters v. Furnco Construction Co., 688 F.2d 39
(7th Cir. 1982).
54. Goldsboro was one of two schools who challenged the Internal Revenue Service's
decision to terminate the schools' status as tax exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue
Code (§ 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) (1982)), in Bob Jones v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), because
the schools admittedly followed racially discriminatory policies.
55. The inevitability of such an inference depends on many factors, such as the normal
hiring practices in an industry or the reasons for a limited or specialized pool of applicants. For
example, a university may limit hiring of assistant professors to those from the top 10 or 15 Ph.D.
programs. While this limitation excludes consideration of those from Ph.D. programs at most
predominantly black institutions, it does not exclude all blacks. The question is whether the selec-
tivity is legitimate, whether there are real differences in the quality of schools.
56. Standing alone, Furnco is a difficult case because of the Supreme Court's brusque
treatment of the court of appeals' decision, the defendant's separate hiring schemes for blacks and
whites, and the implication that the plaintiffs could not maintain a disparate impact challenge as a
matter of law, rather than because of the facts. The meaning of the case is made easier by the
Court's subsequent unanimous decision in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981) (the defendant's burden in rebutting a claim of individual disparate treatment is the
burden of production, not persuasion). Also, a fairer reading of the court of appeals' decision in
Furnco might have avoided some confusion. The court did not require Furnco to adopt hiring
procedures that maximize hiring minority employees as a duty of Title VII. Rather the court was
attempting a compromise between the company's whites-only list and the plaintiffs' demand that
the company hire at the employment site. Waters v. Furnco Construction Corp., 551 F.2d 1085,
1088-89 (7th Cir. 1977).
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tively uncompelling. This evidence is relevant because the conceptual
definition of disparate impact includes the employer's justification as
well as evidence of adverse impact.
Nor should the Court's rationale in Sweeney determine the signifi-
cance of showing that acceptable alternatives exist. In Sweeney, the
Court rejected the notion that the defendant must prove the "absence
of discriminatory motive"57 in order to rebut an individual's claim of
disparate treatment. It did so for two reasons. First, this standard
would make the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis superflu-
ous because the defendant would have to prove what McDonnell
Douglas contemplated the plaintiff would prove.58 Second, proving the
absence of discriminatory motive would impose on the defendant a sub-
stantially different, heavier burden than McDonnell Douglas warrants.
In the case of the former, the Court's concern in Sweeney was not
the number of stages in the analysis; rather, the Court was concerned
with the consequence of eliminating the rebuttal stage. In individual
disparate treatment cases, eliminating the rebuttal would alter signifi-
cantly the defendant's burden. This different burden would require the
defendant to prove that the reason for its action was nondiscrimina-
tory, rather than simply to offer another explanation for its action. It
would elevate the plaintiff's prima facie case to the equivalent of a fac-
tual finding of discriminatory refusal to promote, rather than simply
raise an inference. It was the imposition of these substantively different
burdens that the Court in Sweeney rejected. The defendant in Sweeney,
like the defendant in Furnco, had merely responded to the plaintiff's
prima facie case with some reason to dispel the inference suggested by
the plaintiffs evidence and did not disprove the plaintiffs prima facie
case.
The view that alternatives are relevant in judging the adequacy of
the defendant's justification in disparate impact cases does not require
the defendant to prove what Albemarle contemplated the plaintiff
should prove.59 Evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case
supports a factual finding that the challenged selection criterion has an
adverse impact on the minority group in question. If the defendant at-
tempts to justify this criterion, the defendant's burden is in the nature of
an affirmative defense. 60 The effect of not limiting the use of alternatives
evidence to the plaintiffs rebuttal does not necessarily change these
substantive burdens or who bears the burden of persuasion on the alter-
57. Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 25.
58. Id. at 24 n.1.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 6-18.
60. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2, at 392-94. Contra NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657
F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981).
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native issue. The argument that plaintiffs opportunity for rebuttal
somehow limits the utility of alternatives evidence to proving inten-
tional discrimination assumes some independent significance to a three-
step analysis. Surely the number of steps in an analysis is not the point.
The order of proof should be allocated in light of the issues, evidence,
and burdens of proof, not vice versa.
The second concern of the Court in Sweeney was to avoid impos-
ing the burden of proving the absence of discriminatory motive. Prov-
ing the absence of discriminatory motive is a more onerous burden than
proving the existence of a proper one. That is, even if the defendant
proved the existence of a proper motive, such proof would not necessar-
ily negate the existence of an improper motive. 6' The Court's rejection
of both such burdens as an appropriate formulation of the defendant's
burden in individual disparate treatment cases makes clear that the
defendant's burden in such cases is one of denial, not affirmative
justification.62
Most courts also agree that, under the disparate impact theory, the
defendant need not prove the absence of less discriminatory alterna-
tives." It is not necessary, however, to limit consideration of alterna-
tives altogether in order to avoid the burden of proving the negative.
Considering alternatives in evaluating the defendant's justification does
not in itself impose on the defendant the burden of proving the absence
of less discriminatory alternatives. Only if the existence of alternatives
were dispositive would the effect be to require the defendant to prove
the absence of alternatives to avoid liability. The suggestion that alter-
natives evidence is relevant to more than proving intentional discrimi-
nation does not make the evidence dispositive of the defendant's liabil-
ity. While alternatives evidence can be used to evaluate the relationship
between the selection criterion and the employer's purpose, or to judge
the importance of the employer's interest in a particular selection crite-
rion, this evidence is merely relevant, not dispositive. 64
61. See supra notes 42-43.
62. Contrary to the suggestion of Booth & Mackay, supra note 2, Sweeney does not
discuss the defendant's burden ofjustification in disparate impact cases. The authors cite the por-
tion of the court of appeals' decision where it talks about proving the absence of discriminatory
motive, but proving the absence is clearly not "in connection with proof of job-relatedness."
Booth & MacKay, supra note 2, at 192 n.275.
63. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 n.29 (4th Cir. 1982); Chrisner v.
Complete Auto Trans., Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1260 (6th Cir. 1981); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles,
656 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1981); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 110
(2d Cir. 1980).
64. This point is similar to Ely's in Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). He argues that the reason courts traditionally were
reluctant to inquire into legislative motivation was the assumption that motive was dispositive-it
"invalidate[d] laws which by their language and their effects fully satisfy the Constitution's various
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Thus, Sweeney clarifies that the defendant's burden in individual
disparate treatment cases is merely to rebut the adverse inference sug-
gested by the plaintiff's prima facie case. The Court's concern about not
imposing undue burdens on the defendant must be understood in this
limited context. In justifying a selection criterion that has an adverse
impact, defendants advance a fundamentally different argument: spe-
cifically, that notwithstanding the selection criterion's adverse impact,
the criterion is legitimate because it relates to job performance or other
important business considerations. At most, Sweeney supports the no-
tion that, when the plaintiff in a disparate impact case uses less discrimi-
natory alternatives to prove that the defendant intentionally discrimi-
nated, the burden is on the plaintiff.65 Determining who has the burden
of proof, however, does not determine the significance of the evidence.
B. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer
The Court's decision in New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer66 is critical to the question of the relevance of alternatives evi-
dence. The Transit Authority, operating the subway system and certain
bus lines in New York City, had a policy against employing persons
who used narcotic drugs. Methadone, used in the treatment of heroin
addiction, was considered a narcotic for purposes of the Authority's
rule. The plaintiffs, representing all persons who had been or would
have been subject to the rule, alleged that the application of the em-
ployer's rule to methadone maintenance program participants was un-
constitutional as a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause, as well as a violation of Title VII and Section 1981.67
tests of legitimacy." Id. at 1207. Once it is clear that an official's state of mind simply triggers
judicial scrutiny and demands a justification, the reason for not inquiring into motivation
disappears.
One could also argue that if the burden were to prove the nonexistence of alternatives, that
burden is not so onerous. For example, several courts have suggested that the defendant can make
a preliminary demonstration that other alternatives are not feasible or do not serve the same inter-
est of the employer. The plaintiff can then offer in evidence alternatives the defendant failed to
consider. See, e.g., Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1290 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981)
(dissenting opinion); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, 458 F. Supp. 252, 270 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Uniform
Guidelines: Questions and Answers, supra note 11, at 12,003.
65. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
66. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), providing that "all persons... shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens,"
prohibits employment discrimination based on race. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). It is less clear that § 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 169 (1976) (§ 1981 does not address sex segregation in schools)
(dictum); Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Authority for Fed-
eral Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1977).
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The basis of the equal protection challenge was not that the methadone
rule implied racial discrimination, but rather that the blanket exclusion
of all users from all jobs was not rationally related to any legitimate
interest of the defendant.68 The district court found the employer's pol-
icy unconstitutional, and the finding subsequently was affirmed by the
court of appeals.
In a supplemental opinion issued nearly a year later the district
court ruled that the blanket exclusion also violated Title VII, thereby
permitting the court to award attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.69 The
court concluded that the blanket exclusion had an adverse impact on
blacks and Hispanics." ° Because the court already had determined in its
constitutional analysis that the rule was not rationally related to any
business need of the Transit Authority," such impact was not justified
according to Title VII standards.7 2
Criticizing the lower courts for deciding the constitutional issues
before the statutory one, the Supreme Court reversed the district
court's determinations on both issues. The Court characterized the
plaintiffs' Title VII statistical showing as "at best" weak and then stated
that the prima facie case was "assuredly rebutted by TA's demonstra-
tion that its narcotics rule (and the rule's application to methadone
users) is 'job-related."' 7 3 According to the Supreme Court, the district
court found that the blanket exclusion of all methadone users signifi-
68. Thus, the plaintiffs did not allege that the adverse impact of the no-drug rule was the
equivalent of racial discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause, an argument rejected by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
nor did the district court treat drug users as a suspect class, 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1057-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). In rejecting the lower courts' findings of unconstitutionality, however, the Supreme Court in
Beazer stated that the lower courts scrutinized the Transit Authority's rule too closely, Beazer, 440
U.S. at 592-94. See also Ill. Note, supra note 2, at 208 n. 166 (although district court used the phrase
"no rational relationships," the court exercised a more exacting scrutiny).
69. The Title VII decision was necessary for the attorney's fees award until Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)), which provides for attorney's fees to prevailing parties on
constitutional claims such as those under § 1983.
70. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
71. Id.
72. Once the district court found an adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics, the Title
VII violation was clear because a rule that cannot be justified under constitutional standards can-
not be justified under Title VII. In contrast, finding an act constitutionally permissible does not
settle the question of whether a statutory standard is violated. In Board of Regents of Univ. of
Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408-21 (1978) (Stevens, J. dissenting), four justices did not reach the
question of the constitutionality of the medical school's special admission program, but found it
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982), prohibiting racial
discrimination in federally funded programs.
73. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587.
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cantly served the Transit Authority's interests in safety and efficiency.74
Because the Griggs standard only required that a rule bear a "manifest
relationship to the employment in question,"7 5 the nexus suggested by
the district court was sufficient. The Supreme Court then said that "[t]he
District Court's express finding that the rule was not motivated by ra-
cial animus foreclose[d] any claim in rebuttal that it was merely a pre-
text for intentional discrimination." 6 Finally, the Court concluded
that the Transit Authority's blanket exclusion of methadone users was
rationally related to the Authority's interest in a capable and reliable
work force, thus constitutionally permissible.
1. THE BROAD VIEW OF BEAZER
Beazer provides the clearest evidence and most persuasive argu-
ment that, if relevant at all, evidence of alternatives is relevant only to
establish intentional discrimination. Beazer has several implications.
First, since Beazer was argued and analyzed as a disparate impact case,
there is no doubt about its applicability to future disparate impact
cases, as there may be with the two disparate treatment cases, Furnco
and Sweeney, discussed above.
Second, the Court in Beazer clearly equated the rebuttal stage of
disparate impact analysis with proof of discriminatory motivation. Be-
cause all the parties and. the lower courts had conceded that the Transit
Authority's policy was not adopted with a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, the Court concluded that all plaintiffs' rebuttal arguments were
foreclosed.
Third, the Court did not consider evidence of alternatives in deter-
mining either that the defendant met its burden or that the plaintiffs
failed to meet theirs. The Court did not measure the defendant's justifi-
cation in terms of the availability of alternative procedures that also
served the employer's interest but with less adverse impact. Alternatives
existed, as the district court found, but they played no part in the
Supreme Court's determination. Thus, the Court seemed to reject the
idea that evidence of alternatives can aid in judging the adequacy of the
defendant's justification.
Finally, Beazer suggests a diminution of the defendant's burden of
proof.77 In the district court the defendant admitted that the challenged
74. Id. at 587 n.31. Given the district court's conclusion that the no-drug rule was not
rationally related to any interest of the employer, it is clear that the district court did not conclude
what the Supreme Court said it did.
75. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
76. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587.
77. Furnish, supra note 2, at 439.
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rule did not result from a reasoned policy decision and stipulated that it
never studied the ability of methadone users to perform jobs at the
Transit Authority.78 The defendant also stipulated that one reason for
the rule was fear of adverse public reaction if it were generally known
widely that the Transit Authority employed persons with a history of
drug abuse, including persons participating in methadone maintenance
programs.7 9 The defendants proved only that some, but not all or sub-
stantially all, participants in methadone maintenance programs were
unemployable by the Transit Authority.8" The majority opinion in
Beazer stated that "the record thus demonstrates" job-relatedness. 8'
In finding the Transit Authority's rule "job-related," the Court im-
posed no meaningful burden on the employer. While the record might
be read as supporting the Court's conclusion about some methadone
maintenance participants, the Court's statement was based primarily
on its assumptions about the employability of most methadone mainte-
nance participants. Such assumptions were far less than the proof re-
quired by the Supreme Court's previous disparate impact cases.8 2 Be-
cause the Court held that the rule was justified on this limited evidence,
the decision in Beazer can be read to suggest that the defendant's bur-
den in disparate impact cases differs little from the "articulate, but not
prove" burden in disparate treatment cases. 83 The burdens would not
be exactly the same, since the defendant's burden in disparate treatment
cases is to articulate a nondiscriminatory, rather than a reasonable, ba-
sis for its actions. But the point is that the plaintiff's prima facie case
would be rebutted without evidence that persuaded the court.84
78. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 n.15 (White, J. dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 577-78.
81. ld. at 587 n.31.
82. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). See also Furnish, supra note 2, at
431-32.
83. The reference is to the defendant's burden in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973) (articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason). Booth & MacKay, supra
note 2, at 192-93 say this characterization of the defendant's burden of proof is a holding in
Beazer. AccordThompson & Christiansen, supra note 2, at 600. Since the Court purports to judge
the Transit Authority's rule by traditional standards, this diminution is only implied. Cf. Ga.
Note, supra note 2, at 414-15 (while the opinion in Beazer is susceptible to such a reading, the
opinion is not conclusive because of the weakness of the plaintiff's statistics and the Court's failure
to focus on the defendant's burden); Comment, supra note 2, at 918 (while the Court seemed to
apply a lenient standard, it did not make explicit "the parameters of the defense").
84. The argument is that Beazer suggests lowering the burden of proof to one of produc-
tion, rather than persuasion. The suggested similarity does not extend to the kind of reason offered
by the defendant. While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of what consti-
tutes a legitimate reason in individual disparate treatment cases, Texas Dep't of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), strongly suggests that "legitimate" simply means not linked
to race or gender. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 16, at 62. Compare
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2. ANOTHER READING OF BEAZER
The common reading of Beazer is outlined above. The Court up-
held the validity of the Transit Authority's exclusion rule on the basis of
the Court's assumptions rather than the defendant's proof of the rule's
relationship to job performance. The Court did not consider evidence
of alternatives in deciding whether the defendant met its burden or the
plaintiffs failed to meet theirs. Finally, the Court equated the plaintiff's
rebuttal with proof of discriminatory motive, foreclosing consideration
of the plaintiff's evidence that less discriminatory alternatives were
available to the defendant. According to this view, the defendant's bur-
den of proof in disparate impact cases is nearly identical to that in dis-
parate treatment cases.
Certainly the Court could have explained its decision more ade-
quately, but Beazer need not be read as signaling a substantial altera-
tion of the disparate impact theory of liability. The district court appar-
ently treated the Title VII issue as an afterthought.85 The Supreme
Court's opinion dealt summarily with the defendant's burden of proof
and the plaintiff's rebuttal in one short paragraph and one footnote.8 6
Limiting the utility of alternatives evidence, however, was not argued
Furnish, supra note 2, at 437 (the employer's reason must have a connection with the business goal
of securing a competent and trustworthy workforce) with Smith, supra note 2, at 379 (the issue in
disparate treatment cases is not whether the defendant is able to prove a business reason for a
particular action, but rather whether the defendant intentionally discriminated). In contrast, dis-
parate impact analysis restricts justifications to those that are related to business interests. The
scope of permissible justifications is discussed infra text accompanying notes 135-59.
The Third Circuit has adopted this minimal burden for disparate impact cases. NAACP v.
Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). In Medical Center, plaintiffs challenged the
medical facility's decision to relocate in the suburbs under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
alleging the plan had an adverse impact on minority group members. In rejecting the claim, the
court relied entirely on its understanding of Title VII cases. The court said it was illogical to
impose a heavier burden on a defendant in disparate impact cases than in disparate treatment
cases because the allegation of intentional discrimination is more serious. Moreover, reducing the
defendant's burden in disparate impact cases is consistent with the rationale of Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), which can be read to imply a symmetry between the approach
to disparate impact and disparate treatment cases. Medical Center, 657 F.2d at 1335-36. Accord-
ing to the court, "uniformity in the procedural aspects of impact and intent cases is highly desir-
able and should not be sacrificied on dubious theories. . . . Although one need not worship at its
shrine, symmetry is not always sinful." Id. at 1336. The court, however, misconceived the nature of
the disparate impact prima facie case and the purpose of the defendant's response. See supra text
accompanying notes 44-49. Cf Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703 & n.5 (8th Cir.
1980) (author of opinion says defendant's burden is at least one of producing evidence, and he
would say also one of persuasion, suggesting controversy).
85. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 582 (the district court apparently decided the Title VII claim only
to award attorney's fees).
86. ld. at 587 & n.31.
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by the defendant, nor did the Court focus on the issue.87 If one does not
try to make Beazer more difficult than it is, or stand for more than it
does, one sees several reasons why the result in Beazer was not depen-
dant upon applying defendant's burden of proof in disparate treatment
cases to disparate impact cases.
First, the parties did consider evidence of alternatives. In its brief,
the defendant stated that "whether the employment policy in question
is a business necessity includes consideration of the alternative practices
available to the employer." 88 The defendant argued that the only alter-
native to the blanket exclusion was individualized determinations of
employability. While other cases have required defendants to use indi-
vidualized determinations, 89 Beazer did not involve the simple adminis-
tration of a strength test or the validity of a standardized intelligence
test. Without the rule, the employer would have been required to distin-
guish among various kinds of methadone users and to monitor the
treatment of those methadone users it did employ. Moreover, an under-
lying issue in Beazer was the efficacy of methadone maintenance pro-
grams for treating heroin addiction. One could conclude that the Court
considered evidence of alternatives but rejected the alternative as
unworkable. 9°
Second, the Court may have upheld the Transit Authority's blan-
ket exclusion because it recognized the Authority's public image as a
legitimate, although not job-related, interest of the employer. The
Transit Authority stated that one reason for the rule was its fear of
adverse public reaction if it were generally known that the Authority
employed persons with a prior history of drug abuse, including persons
participating in methadone maintenance programs.9 ' In the dissent's
view, the Transit Authority was not the type of official body that nor-
87. This inadequate treatment suggests that the Court was eager to reach the constitu-
tional issue in order to reverse the lower courts' rulings in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court criti-
cized the lower courts for their eagerness to reach the constitutional issues. Id. at 582-83. For a
discussion of the constitutional aspects of Beazer, see Note, The Employment Interest and an Irra-
tional Application of the Rationality Test: New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 51 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 641 (1980).
88. Brief for Petitioners at 53, New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979).
89. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight is not a legiti-
mate proxy for strength); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (standardized intelli-
gence tests are not useful in determining who to hire or promote).
90. A similar conclusion is reached in cases alleging age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). In Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1976), the court upheld the company's rule placing
a maximum age of 40 on new bus drivers. The court acknowledged that individuals age at different
rates but found that individual qualifications cannot be reliably determined. Accord Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974).
91. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Beazer.
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mally makes such judgments to which it may reasonably expect the
Court to defer.92 The majority, however, did defer to the Transit Au-
thority's judgment in deciding that the rule was constitutional.93
One may certainly question whether an interest in image is a legiti-
mate reason to sustain a rule that adversely affects blacks and Hispan-
ics. Under Title VII, the question is whether the notion of "business
necessity" should include and protect such interests of public employ-
ers. One reading of Beazer suggests that such non-job-related interests
are legitimate, at least given the total employment picture at the Transit
Authority.94 Arguably, the Court approved the Authority's blanket ex-
clusion because the Court was not prepared to require employment of
drug addicts, including those dependent on methadone, by an industry
whose primary interest is the safe transportation of the public.95
Finally, although the Court clearly equated the plaintiff's rebuttal
with proof of discriminatory motive, the Court's decision did not make
evidence of alternatives irrelevant. After summarily finding the Transit
Authority's exclusion rule "assuredly job-related," the Court said that
"the District Court's express finding that the rule was not motivated by
racial animus forecloses any claim in rebuttal that it was merely a pre-
text for intentional discrimination." 96 This statement is clearly right. If
the parties agree or the Court decides that a rule is not racially-moti-
vated, the plaintiff can hardly argue later that it is. The Court did not,
however, say that pretext is the only relevant issue on rebuttal. If the
Court considered alternatives to the blanket exclusion but rejected
them as unworkable, then the Court's limitation of the plaintiff's rebut-
tal is even more understandable. The Court was merely stating the obvi-
ous: if alternatives are considered but rejected, the plaintiff can make no
further argument based on their existence; a finding of fact that a rule
was not racially motivated similarly precludes further argument that it
was.
9 7
92. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 n.15 (White, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 592-94.
94. Blacks and Hispanics were not underrepresented in the Transit Authority's
workforce. Forty-six percent of Authority's employees were black and Hispanic, and blacks con-
stituted 15%, Hispanics 5%, of the relevant labor market. Brief for Petitioners at 52-53, Beazer.
See also Ga. Note, supra note 2, at 414. The Supreme Court subsequently rejected the argument
that this "bottom line" excuses the employer from proving the job-relatedness of a selection proce-
dure, at least in the context of the need to validate a written test. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440 (1982), discussed infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
95. Smith, supra note 2, at 399.
96. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587.
97. Cf. Furnish, supra note 2, at 424. (Beazer "leaves little room to argue that the imposi-
tion of a rebuttal burden only serves to give the plaintiff an opportunity to undercut the defense of
job-relatedness .. "(emphasis added). This statement is also right. Plaintiffs rebuttal is not a
limited opportunity to make only one argument. Depending on the facts and the defenses argued,
1985:1
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Thus, the Court's decision in Beazer is consistent with, rather than
an alteration of, the traditional disparate impact theory of liability. One
could, of course, disagree on the merits with the suggested conclusions.
For example, one could argue that individualized determinations were
possible at the Transit Authority or that some other alternative existed,
that "image" was not a legitimate interest, or that the Court's statement
limiting rebuttal was too sweeping. These disagreements, however, dif-
fer significantly from suggestions that Beazer signals a diminished stan-
dard of liability for the defendant.
Clearly, there is much to criticize in the Court's opinion. The
Court incorrectly characterized the district court's record as showing
that the blanket exclusion of all methadone users from all jobs signifi-
cantly served the Transit Authority's interests in safety and efficiency.
In fact, in reaching its decision on the constitutional issues, the district
court stated that "the blanket exclusionary policy against persons on
methadone maintenance is not rationally related to the safety needs, or
any other needs, of the [Transit Authority]." '9 8 The district court reiter-
ated this conclusion in its Title VII opinion.99 Contrary to the Supreme
Court's characterization, the district court simply did not find the re-
quired nexus between the exclusion rule and the jobs at the Transit
Authority.
Furthermore, the Court disposed of the Title VII issue on the mer-
its rather than remand the case to the court of appeals.10o The majority
concluded that it was appropriate to reach the merits in this case be-
cause the Title VII issue was fully litigated in the district court, involved
the application of settled legal principles to uncontroversial facts, and
had been carefully briefed in the Supreme Court.' 1o It is difficult, how-
ever, to accept the characterizations that the facts are uncontroversial,
the legal issues settled, or the attention paid to the issues careful, if the
Court was substantially altering the nature of disparate impact liability
in one paragraph and one footnote. While the Court should have re-
manded the case for reasons of judicial economy and efficiency, it had
the authority to decide the Title VII claim. The failure to remand, how-
ever, supports the view that the Court did not intend to alter the dispa-
rate impact theory of liability.1 2
rebuttal can provide different opportunities. Moreover, rebuttal is not the only appropriate time to
raise alternative selection criteria.
98. Beazer, 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (emphasis added).
99. Beazer, 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
100. As the dissent pointed out, the Court's common practice in this kind of situation is to
remand the unexplored basis for relief. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 597 (White, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 583 n.24.
102. Contra Maltz, supra note 2, at 351-52 (failure to remand means alternatives are only
relevant to intent). See also, Note, Employment Discrimination-PlaintiF's Prima Facie Case and
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Moreover, the Court's treatment of the defense burden perhaps
was not critical to its decision for two reasons independent of the issue
of alternatives. First, the plaintiff's statistical evidence was weak. The
plaintiffs relied on evidence showing that blacks and Hispanics were
overrepresented in methadone maintenance programs compared to
their proportions in the population. The majority characterized the sta-
tistics used for this comparison as "virtually irrelevant" and incom-
plete. 10 3 More importantly, the overrepresentation of blacks and His-
panics in methadone programs, even if based on more refined statistics,
provided only tangential support for the claim that the Transit Author-
ity's no-drug rule excluded disproportionately more blacks and His-
panics than Anglos. The dissent argued that the Court could infer that
overrepresentation in methadone maintenance programs would lead to
a higher rate of exclusion from Transit Authority jobs.10 4 But, the
plaintiffs' statistics merely suggest disparate impact. At most, these sta-
tistics were indirect evidence and supported an inference that the court
was not required to draw.10 5 The practical problem suggested by the
plaintiffs' evidence in Beazer is that inaccurate statistical comparisons
obscure the "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment"106 created by the defendant's rule.
Second, Beazer is more appropriately characterized as a challenge
to the exclusion of present and former drug addicts from employment.
As such, the case raises issues concerning section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973,107 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
handicap in federally assisted programs. The suggestion that the real
issue in Beazer is not racial discrimination but rather handicap discrim-
ination does not mean that the outcome of a section 504 challenge is
obvious or that the decision would have been easier."0 8 Casting Beazer
as a handicap discrimination case does, though, provide a perspective
for the Court's stingy interpretation of Title VII. Although a blanket
rule disqualifying methadone maintenance participants would seem to
violate section 504, the Court had not yet held that section 504 applied
to employment discrimination.109
Defendant's Rebuttal in a Disparate Impact Case, 54 TUL. L. REV. 1187, 1197 (1980) (failure to
remand is inconsistent with Court's previous Title VII cases).
103. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 586.
104. Id. at 598-602.
105. Lamber, Reskin & Dworkin, supra note 10, at 595, 597.
106. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
108. The plaintiffs argued the effect of § 504 was to moot the case. Beazer, 440 U.S.
at 580-8 1.
109. The Court only recently held that § 504 applied to discrimination in employment.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S.Ct. 1248 (1984). Moreover, the Court declined to give§
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Finally, a more fundamental reason to resist reading Beazer as sig-
naling a lower standard of Title VII liability lies in the basic difference
between the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. The pri-
mary reason advanced for reading Beazer as lowering the disparate im-
pact standard is the similarity between the disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment defenses suggested by the Court in Beazer. If the decision
is interpreted as allowing the Transit Authority's unjustified, overly
broad rule to stand in the face of significant adverse impact, the defen-
dant's burden is nothing more than to articulate a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the hiring practice." a0 So characterized, the bur-
dens of proof and the utility of alternatives evidence are basically the
same in disparate impact and disparate treatment cases. But the
Supreme Court continues to stress that disparate impact and disparate
treatment are conceptually and fundamentally different theories of dis-
crimination. 1 ' Why should we read Beazer to suggest that they are
not? There ought to be a good reason for accepting Beazer's implication
of merger, and the Court did not give us one. Had the Court intended a
drastic change in the disparate impact theory, it likely would have made
the change explicit and would have adequately explained it.11z If we
resist the implication of merger, Beazer neither diminishes the burdens
of proof nor changes what evidence is relevant. Furthermore, if the
analogy to disparate treatment is inaccurate but one maintains that
Beazer signals a new standard, the new standard must be that cost or
change sufficiently justifies a rule that has an adverse impact on minor-
ity group members. Any employer interest can meet this standard. At a
minimum, the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs rejected this cost jus-
tification. Thus, without the analogy to disparate treatment or the
504 its first judicial construction at this stage of the litigation, given that the original action in
Beazer was brought before § 504 was enacted. For a general discussion of liability under § 504, see
Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect
to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1984);
Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1984); Note, Death Knellfor Trageser:
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in Light of North Haven, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 371 (1983).
110. Belton, supra note 18, at 1246-47; Furnish, supra note 2, at 439.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
112. The Court has done so on other occasions involving Title Vii controversies. In Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Supreme Court explicitly
reversed the unanimous view of the courts of appeals that § 703(h), exempting bona fide seniority
systems from the prohibitions of Title VII, did not protect seniority systems that perpetuated the
effects of past racial discrimination. In General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court
explicitly reversed the unanimous view of the courts of appeals that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy in fringe benefit programs was a violation of Title VII. Whether the Court adequately
explained its reasoning is questionable, but the Court at least attempted to do so. See The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 241, 242-43, 256-58 (1977).
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merger of the theories, Beazer is a difficult case about former drug ad-
dicts, a case with faulty evidence and a bad track record.
C. Additional Support from Other Supreme Court Decisions
The view that evidence of alternatives is not limited to proving in-
tentional discrimination finds further support in two other Supreme
Court cases, Dothard v. Rawlinson113 and Connecticut v. Teal.1 14 In
Dothard v. Rawlinson the plaintiff challenged the validity under Title
VII of Alabama's minimum height and weight requirements for prison
guards. In upholding the district court's judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs, the Court described the latter stages of the disparate impact analy-
sis: "Once it is thus shown that the employment standards are discrimi-
natory in effect, the employer must meet 'the burden of showing that
any given requirement [has]. . .a manifest relation to the employment
in question."""l If the employer proves that the challenged require-
ments are job-related, the plaintiff then may show that other selection
devices without a similar discriminatory effect also would serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in "efficient and trustworthy workman-
ship."' 16 Although quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court
did not repeat that the purpose of such a showing would be to prove
"pretext" or intentional discrimination."1 7
Moreover, in discussing the defendant's failure to meet its burden
of proof, the Court noted that alternative hiring practices were avail-
able to the defendant. The defendant argued that height and weight
have a relationship to strength and that a "sufficient but unspecified
amount of [strength] is essential to effective job performance" of prison
guards.'18 The Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the
defendant failed to offer any evidence correlating height and weight
with strength to justify the specific standard. Second, the Court ex-
pressed suspicion that strength was the important job quality it was
asserted to be, noting that the defendant's purpose could have been
113. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
114. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
115. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
116. Id.
117. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the three concurring justices also repeated the three-
part analysis in Aibemarle without limiting the purpose of alternatives evidence. Id. at 339. Justice
Rehnquist said that if the defendant had argued the job qualification was the appearance of
strength, rather than actual strength, the employer could have prevailed. He also stated that the
defendant's burden is one of production, rather than persuasion. Id. at 339-40. Subsequent dispa-
rate impact opinions of the Court do not endorse this statement. See also infra note 139. Cf.
Furnish, supra note 2, at 428; Ga. Note, supra note 2, at 410-1I.
118. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331.
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achieved by "adopting and validating a test for applicants that mea-
sures strength directly." 1 19
Those who argue for a restricted use of alternatives see Dothard as
an exception and thus dismiss its importance. 120 With a more modest
reading of the other cases-such as Furnco, Sweeney, and Beazer-
Dothard is not an exceptional case but is merely the continuation of a
pattern: evidence of alternatives can be relevant in disparate impact
cases in various ways and is not limited to proving intentional discrimi-
nation on the part of the defendant.'12
The real limitation of Dothard is the Court's finding that a more
obviously discriminatory rule was permissible. During the pendency of
the case, Alabama's Board of Corrections adopted regulation 204,
which segregated prison guard jobs on the basis of sex. Under the regu-
lation, only men were qualified to be prison guards in contact positions
in all-male maximum security institutions. The Court upheld the regu-
lation as within the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception of
Title VII. 1 2 2 According to the Court, the particular factual circum-
stances of violence and disorganization in the state's prisons meant that
a woman's ability to maintain order as a prison guard would be directly
reduced by her womanhood. 123
The adoption of regulation 204 during the litigation suggests that
the purpose of the height and weight requirement was, in fact, to ex-
clude as many women as possible from the job of prison guard. When
the state's covert attempt became vulnerable, it simply made the exclu-
sion overt. The existence of this discriminatory motive, although ac-
ceptable under Title VII according to the Court, supports the argument
that the distinctions between disparate impact and disparate treatment
are not as great as the underlying theories suggest. 124 With the decision
119. Id. at 332.
120. E.g., Maltz, supra note 2, at 351-52 & n.38; Ill. Note, supra note 2, at 204 n.144.
121. Dothard is an exceptional case in another sense, representing the broadest applica-
tion of the disparate impact theory. Dothard involved several facts that distinguish it from other
disparate impact cases decided by the Court. It involved gender, not racial, discrimination; the
selection criterion was objective but not a scored pencil and paper test; the Court found the dispa-
rate impact definition of discrimination in the general provisions prohibiting discrimination, not in
an interpretation of§ 703(h) concerning professionally developed tests. In outlining the burdens of
proof, the Court clearly distinguished between the disparate impact and treatment theories of
discrimination and did not rely on or cite McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
122. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 336. See also supra note 47 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of the "bfoq" exception.
123. The implications of the Court's substantive conclusion have been severely criticized.
See, e.g., Note, Title VII, Sex Discrimination and a New Bona Fide Occupational Qualification-
How Bona Fide?, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 466 (1978); Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualifica-
tion: Defining Title VIIs Evolving Enigma, Related Litigation Problems, and the Judicial Vision of
Womanhood After Dothard v. Rawlinson, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107 (1979).
124. Furnish, supra note 2, at 442.
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in Dothard, all cases in which the Court applied the disparate impact
theory had evidence or a history of intentional discrimination underly-
ing them.' 5 Consequently, one could have surmised that disparate im-
pact was merely a different method of getting to the elusive question of
discriminatory motive. 12
6
The Supreme Court's most recent disparate impact case, however,
has no hint of intentional discrimination against minority group mem-
bers. In Connecticut v. Teal,1 27 the plaintiffs challenged Connecticut's
selection process for welfare supervisors. The state's promotion scheme
required, first, passing a written test and, second, consideration of work
experience, recommendations, and seniority. Evidence showed that dis-
proportionately more blacks than whites failed the test but that dispro-
portionately more blacks than whites were promoted. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the scheme violated Title VII because the state had not
"validated" the written test, showing it to be job-related. The state ar-
gued that the result of the entire process, reflecting no adverse impact
on minority group members, precluded the finding of a Title VII
violation. 128
In rejecting the defendant's "bottom line" argument, the Court
made clear that there was no hint of intentional discrimination against
blacks. The Court said "resolution of the factual question of intent is
not what is at issue in this case. Rather, [defendants] seek simply to
justify discrimination against [plaintiffs], on the basis of their favorable
treatment of other members of [plaintiffs'] racial group." 129 Moreover,
the court of appeals had characterized the second stage of
Connecticut's promotion process as including an affirmative action
125. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197 1); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975) (history of overt racial discrimination). Cf. New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (no history or evidence of intentional racial discrimination and the
Supreme Court upheld a blanket exclusion of methadone maintenance participants). According to
Furnish, supra note 2, at 442-43, this similarity (intentional discrimination underlying disparate
impact claim) accounts for the Court's failure to maintain the theoretical separation of disparate
impact and disparate treatment theories. But see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
126. See, e.g., Furnish, supra note 2, at 442-44; Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 296-304 (1971).
127. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
128. The defendant argued both that the so-called "bottom line" precluded the plaintiffs
from establishing a prima facie case and, alternatively, that it provided a defense. Id. at 447 n.7.
For a more detailed discussion of the Court's decision in Connecticut v. Teal, see Chamallas, supra
note 15; Note, The Bottom Line Concept Under Title VII: Connecticut v. Teal, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1131
(1983); Note, The Bottom Line Concept in Title VII Litigation: Connecticut v. Teal and the Rele-
vance of End Results, 15 CONN. L. REV. 821 (1983); Note, The Bottom Line Defense in Title VII
Actions: Supreme Court Rejection in Connecticut v. Teal and a Modified Approach, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 735 (1983).
129. Teal, 457 U.S. at 454.
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component to ensure a significant number of minority supervisors. 130
Although the defendants contested this characterization, their reaction
means not that there was intentional discrimination against blacks but
merely that there was no intention to favor black applicants.
The Court also made clear that disparate impact is not merely an-
other way of proving intentional discrimination. In rejecting the
defendants' "bottom line" argument, the Court noted that the defend-
ants had confused unlawful discrimination with discriminatory intent.
Although a nondiscriminatory "bottom line" is relevant in rebutting an
inference that a particular action was intentionally discriminatory, the
same "bottom line" could not excuse validating a test with an adverse
impact. 13' The Court concluded by saying that "[e]very individual em-
ployee is protected against both discriminatory treatment and against
'practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.'"132
With the decision in Teal, the Court revitalized the controversy
over the burden of proof placed on defendants to justify a test or other
selection criterion with an adverse impact. Had the Court endorsed the
bottom line theory, employers would have been able to set up any em-
ployment process with impunity, so long as the process resulted in an
appropriate racial balance.' The Court's rejection of the "bottom
130. Id. at 444.
131. Id. at454.
Although the Supreme Court clearly rejected the bottom line theory when the selection
procedure was an absolute barrier to continuing in the selection process, the Court did not discuss
the applicability of the bottom line theory when the selection procedure with an adverse impact
was simply one of several factors. Employers can argue that Tealdoes not apply when there is not
an identifiable step during the selection process at which to measure adverse impact. One district
court, however, has rejected this view of Teal, Williams v. City of San Francisco, 31 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 887 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
132. Id. at 455-56 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431). Although the main disagreement
between the majority and the dissent concerns the point in the selection process to measure adverse
impact, Justice Powell's dissenting opinion asserts that Justice Brennan's majority opinion is fun-
damentally flawed, confusing "the aim of Title VII with the legal theories through which its aims
were intended to be vindicated." Id. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis original). The dissent-
ing opinion also implies that individuals cannot bring disparate impact claims. Justice Powell's
opinion, however, suggests its own confusion about the difference between adverse impact as a
theory of recovery and adverse impact as a kind of evidence to prove intentional discrimination.
Id. at 458-59 & n.3. See Lamber, Reskin & Dworkin, supra note 10, at 554-55.
133. For a thorough discussion of the arguments in favor of the bottom line see
Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept in Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1
(1980): Chamallas, supra note 15. While employers support the bottom line as a way to avoid
justifying selection criteria with an adverse impact, these commentators argue that the result in
Teal will hurt rather than help minority group members' advancement in the workplace, at least in
the short run.
They contend that an immediate increase in the number of minority group members in the
workplace is more important than eliminating the adverse consequences of a given selection crite-
rion or justifying its use. See Chamallas, supra note 15, at 361-70; Blumrosen, The 'Bottom Line'
After Connecticut v. Teal, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 572, 574-75 (1983). See also, Bartholet, Applica-
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line," however, means there will be increased efforts to justify selection
criteria with an adverse impact and thus reemphasizes the importance
of determining the nature of the defendants' burden as well as the utility
of alternatives evidence in disparate impact cases. 
134
tion of Title VI to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1027 (1982). Proponents of the
bottom line also fear that employers will too easily validate selection criteria that exclude signifi-
cant numbers of minority group members. See Comments of Eleanor Holmes Norton, Excerpts
from Transcript of EEOC Commissioners Meeting (Dec. 22, 1977), DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA) No.
43, at E-4 (Mar. 3, 1978). The approach suggested here mitigates this latter danger by placing
validation in the larger context of the purposes of Title VI I. See infra notes 161-207. Most impor-
tantly, they assert that Teal may reduce the incentive for employers to engage in affirmative action
because it no longer shields the use of unjustified criteria. Chamallas, supra note 15, at 370-76.
Whether Teal reduces the incentive for employers to engage in affirmative action is an unan-
swered empirical question. Id. at 313. Employers engage in affirmative action for other reasons
including union, employee or customer pressure and their own public image. See id. at 373. More-
over, not all bottom line results stem from affirmative action efforts. While the operation of fortui-
tous offsetting selection devices may have the same result as conscious affirmative action in some
instances, it may also mean that when a disproportionately high number of minority group mem-
bers are qualified they will in the end be underrepresented if the employer's workforce is only
compared at the bottom line. Thus, the bottom line may represent a maximum as well as a mini-
mum standard by which to measure discrimination. Compare Chamallas, supra note 15, at 375-76
(fortuitous offsetting selection devices the same as conscious affirmative action) with Shoben,
Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analy-
sis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. I, 30 (1977) (equal opportunity means more than hiring
"acceptable" numbers of minority group members), in which each discusses situations where an
admittedly valid selection criterion favoring blacks is coupled with an unvalidated test that has an
adverse impact on blacks.
In addition to the distinction between conscious affirmative action and fortuitous offsetting
devices, one can argue that any protection from Title VII liability ought to depend on the existence
of a plan, rather than ad hoc efforts. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979) (important feature of employer's affirmative action efforts is the existence of a plan rather
than an ad hoc response). Teal itself raises this question because the state maintained that it took
no affirmative action in the selection of welfare supervisors and, whatever it did to achieve the
bottom line result, it did only after the plaintiffs filed suit. Teal, 457 U.S. at 444.
The Court in Weber was concerned not only with the existence of a plan but also with its
content. The employer hired experienced craft workers and the employer's affirmative action effort
was to increase the number of minority group members who met the requirement. If the affirmative
action effort in Weber had been similar to the effort in Teal, the employer would have simply hired
more blacks who had experience. Although this latter approach would have the advantage of
increasing blacks in the workplace in the short run, the former expands job opportunities in both
the short and the long run. Cf. Chamallas, supra note 15, at 349 (merely coincidental factual pecu-
liarity that the affirmative action measure takes the same form as the challenged practice).
Finally, Teal is consistent with Weber. Although voluntary affirmative action may stem
from the employer's wish to be insulated from Title VII liability, the Court in Weber apparently
refused to adopt this "arguable violation" theory as its justification for permissible affirmative
action under Title VII. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Affirmative
action is permissible but it does not excuse employers from other Title VII obligations. The real
distinction between Weber and Teal is the kind of affirmative action efforts Title VII encourages.
134. Chamallas, supra note 15, at 370-79, addressed the question of the relative priority
that should be given to achieving "bottom line" equality and to encouraging use of "valid," non-
discriminatory employment procedures but apparently only in terms of formal validation. Id. at
374 & nn. 328-29. While validation was at issue in Teal, the discussion infra text accompanying
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II. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DISPARATE IMPACT CASES AND
EVIDENCE OF ALTERNATIVES
This section focuses more directly on the competing interests of
employers and minority group members by identifying the ways in
which the existence of alternatives can be used. In addressing this issue,
it is essential to understand, first, what interest the defendant asserts as
a justification and second, why such an interest might justify adverse
impact. Decisions will differ depending on the kind of selection crite-
rion challenged and the employer's reason for using it.
A. Defendant's Burden.- Business Necessity/Job-Relatedness
Controversy
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court described the
defendant's burden of proof for disparate impact cases in several ways:
(1) The employer must show "that any given requirement [has] a mani-
fest relationship to the employment in question." '135 (2) "The touch-
stone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited."' 36 (3) The defendant must show that the poli-
cies bear a "demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the
jobs" for which they are used.' 3 7
Because the Supreme Court needed only to reject an erroneously
narrow view of Title VII to find in favor of the plaintiffs, it left unan-
swered most questions about the substance of the defendant's burden
of proof. 138 First, what kind of business purposes can justify employer
practices that have an adverse impact? Does the reason the practice has
an impact influence the kind of business purpose that is permissible?
Second, what kind of proof is required to establish the nexus between
the employer's purpose and the challenged employment practice? Is em-
pirical evidence required? Third, how important must the employer's
purpose be? Is a "legitimate" purpose sufficient or need the purpose be
"substantial," "essential," or "compelling"? And fourth, what is the
notes 161-207 indicates that formal validation is not always necessary or sufficient depending on
the defendant's reason for using a selection criterion.
135. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
136. Id. at431.
137. Id.
138. For general discussions of Griggs, including its unresolved questions, written soon
after the Court's decision, see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA.
L. REV. 844 (1972). See also Comment, supra note 2, at 916-17.
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relationship between the terms "business necessity" and "job-related"?
Did the Court use the terms synonymously, as rough equivalents, or to
suggest that proof of both was required?' 3 9
139. Even though the defense standard was left ambiguous, one could argue that the real
meaning of Griggs is that the Court limited the scope of permissible justifications. This limitation is
relatively easy to determine in the context of private, profit-making employers, but it becomes
more difficult once public employers are subject to Title VII. See infra note 154 and text accompa-
nying notes 153-59.
There is the entirely different possibility that the Court in Griggs did not intend to establish a
separate conceptual definition of discrimination which needs to be considered. Several such alter-
nate interpretations of the Court's opinion exist. First, the decision could rest solely on the inter-
pretation of § 703(h), exempting professionally developed ability tests from the general prohibi-
tions of Title VII. The Court's decision in Dothard v. Rawlinson rejects this limitation by applying
the disparate impact analysis to a height and weight requirement. Neither the Court nor the state
discussed this extension of Griggs. Second, the Griggs decision could rest on the factual setting of
the case. Because the Duke Power Company had openly discriminated in the past and adopted the
challenged requirements on the eve of Title VII's effective date, the decision could be seen as a
recognition of the "perpetuating the effects of past discrimination" definition of discrimination.
However, the Court's subsequent decision in Connecticut v. Teal does not involve any history of
overt racial discrimination. Third, the decision in Griggs could rest on a different conception of
intentional discrimination. This reading of Griggs follows Professor Fiss' theory of functional
equivalence, supra note 126, at 296-304 (neutral rules with an adverse impact that are unrelated to
business needs are the equivalent of intentional discrimination). The correctness of this view of
Griggs depends on what kinds of business needs justify challenged employment policies. Fourth,
the Court could have been creating a bfoq exception for race. Such action would be inconsistent
with the statute, which expressly limits the bfoq to sex, religion, and national origin, and subse-
quent cases do not support this reading. Williams, supra note 14, at 671.
In contrast to these restrictive interpretations, the decision could indicate the desirability of
racial quotas in order to improve the economic position of minority group members. Blumrosen,
The 'Bottom Line' After Connecticut v. Teal, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 572, 574-75 (1983) argues that
the adverse impact theory was simply a means to the end of increased minority participation,
rather than independently important. However, the Court's rejection of the bottom line theory in
Connecticut v. Teal, and its refusal to adopt the "arguable violation" theory as its justification for
upholding the affirmative action plan in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), ne-
gates this view.
The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to limit the disparate impact theory and it
has not done so, despite encouragement from Justice Rehnquist. In General Electric v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976), concerning the validity of excluding pregnancy from fringe benefit plans,
Justice Rehnquist said: "Even assuming that it is not necessary in this case to prove intent to
establish a prima facie violation of § 703(a)(1), but cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the
respondents have not made the requisite showing of gender-based effects." Id. at 137 (emphasis
added, citation omitted). This statement brought separate concurrences from Justices Stewart and
Blackman, rejecting the suggestion that Griggs was no longer good law. Again writing for the
majority in Furnco, Justice Rehnquist argued the proper approach was the analysis contained in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (disparate treatment). In a footnote, he distinguished disparate
impact claims, stating: "This case did not involve employment tests which we dealt with in Griggs
• . . nor particularized requirements such as height and weight specifications considered in
Dothard .. ", Furnco, 438 U.S. at 575 n.7, suggesting the disparate impact theory is limited to
challenging those two kinds of neutral rules. The kinds of employment practices subject to dispa-
rate impact analysis remains controversial. See Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th
Cir. 1982).
When Congress amended Title VII in 1972, it specifically approved the court interpretations
that rested on the disparate impact theory: "In any area where the new law does not address itself,
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions shed little additional light on
the nature of the evidence necessary to satisfy the defendant's burden of
proof. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody the Court said that the stan-
dardized intelligence tests at issue are impermissible unless predictive of
or significantly correlated with important work behavior. 140 Two years
later, however, the Court accepted a validation attempt that departed
significantly from this standard. 4 1
In Dothard v. Rawlinson the Court held that the defendant's bur-
den was to show that its height and weight requirements had "a mani-
fest relationship to the employment in question."' 42 Although the
Court reiterated Griggs' job-related standard, it also said that a dis-
criminatory employment practice "must be shown to be necessary to
safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge.' 143
This latter description of the defendant's burden suggests that a show-
ing of job-relatedness may not be sufficient to avoid liability.1 44
Finally, in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, again quot-
ing Griggs, the Court said the defendant's burden was to show that the
rule excluding methadone users bore "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question." 145 The defendant met this burden by show-
ing that the "goals [of safety and efficiency] are significantly served by-
even if they do not require-TA's rule."' 146 This conclusion about the
or in any areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was assumed that the present
case law as developed by the courts would continue to govern the applicability and construction of
Title VII." Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 n.21 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7166
(1972) (emphasis added by the Court)). The Court reaffirmed this view of the legislative history in
Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8 (1982).
140. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431.
141. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (a non-Title VII case). In Washington
v. Davis, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Police Depart-
ment's pre-employment test said to measure verbal ability. After rejecting Griggs'disparate impact
analysis to decide the constitutional question, the Court used Title VII principles in analyzing the
non-Title VII statutory issues. The defendant's evidence of validation differed from the EEOC's
guidelines in two ways. First, the evidence showed only that performance on the test was related to
performance in police training school. It did not show that performance in training school was
related to job performance. Second, the defendant did not use the most demanding method of
validation. See also National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978) (mem.), aff'g.,
United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1978) (approved use of National
Teachers' Examination for hiring and classifying teachers based on validation study which showed
the test measured the familiarity of the candidate with the content of teacher training courses
rather than actual job performance). For a more general discussion of Washington v. Davis and the
validation issue, see Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17; Maltz, supra note 2, at 349-50.
142. 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
143. Id. at 332 n.14 (1977) (emphasis added).
144. See Furnish, supra note 2, at 427-29; Ga. Note, supra note 2, at 410-11.
145. 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979).
146. Id.
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defendant's burden, in direct contrast to Dothard, suggests that the
defendant need not even prove that a requirement is job-related.' 47
During this same period, the lower federal courts were faced with
applying the Supreme Court's vague standards expressed in broad and
varied language. These cases involved the application of the business
necessity/job-related defense not only in cases raising issues similar to
those in the Supreme Court's cases but also in cases raising substan-
tially different issues under different factual situations. In some cases,
for example, the employers did not argue that selection criteria were
justified because they were related to job performance, but rather, that
they were important for other reasons.' 4 8 Using alternate formulations
of the defendant's burden of proof, lower federal courts developed an
equivalent standard by which to evaluate this different sort of
justification.
The Fourth Circuit took the lead in recasting the burden of proof
in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. 4 9 It said the Griggs test as applied to
non-job-related justifications was "whether there exists an overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the
safe and efficient operation of the business. '150
Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to
override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effec-
tively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and
there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or
practices which would better accomplish the business purpose
147. The Supreme Court's most recent disparate impact case, Connecticut v. Teal, repeats
the Griggs' test but does not discuss the nature of the defendant's justification burden because of
the "bottom line" issue.
148. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). Plaintiffs
challenged the validity of seniority systems that perpetuated the effects of past overt discrimina-
tion. Typically, the employer would argue that such seniority systems were justified for reasons
unrelated to job performance, such as providing stability and predictability, and reflecting the
product of collective bargaining. Employers also argued that § 703(h) in Title VII exempted senior-
ity systems unless there was proof of intentional discrimination in their creation or maintenance.
In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Supreme Court
agreed with this broad exemption, rejecting the courts of appeals' substantive conclusion concern-
ing the scope of § 703(h). The Court suggested that if there were no § 703(h) the disparate impact
analysis with its heavy burden of justification would be appropriate. Id. at 349.
149. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The opinion is similar to
decisions in other circuits, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), but it
is subsequent to and relies on Griggs. See Wilson, supra note 138, at 854 n.62.
150. Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798.
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advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differen-
tial impact.' 5
In sum, both Supreme Court and lower court cases provide clues
but no definitive answers to the questions raised by the Court's decision
in Griggs. Regarding business practices that can justify adverse impact,
Albemarle and Griggs assert that an employer's interest in the ability of
employees to perform their jobs is substantial. Robinson holds that an
employer may have legitimate interests other than those related to job
performance. Regarding the proof required of the defendant,
Albemarle and Dothard require specific evidence to establish the nexus
between the employer's purpose and the challenged practice. Beazer im-
plies that the nexus can simply be assumed. Regarding the importance
of the employer's interest, Dothard states that the challenged practice
must be necessary to safe and efficient job performance, but stops short
of requiring the practice to be absolutely necessary. Beazer suggests a
wholesale diminution of the defendant's burden of proof, but the prem-
ise of the defendant's justification is unclear and the Court's discussion
is inadequate.
These cases not only fail to answer the questions raised by Griggs,
they complicate some issues, such as the relationship between the terms
"business necessity" and "job-relatedness." There are several possible
relationships. The Court might have intended two separate defenses:
one involving proof that an employment policy is related to job per-
formance (job-related), and the other involving proof that an employ-
ment policy is necessary to the business (business necessity). Or, the
Court might have intended the terms to be synonymous: concern for
successful job performance is a business necessity and it is necessary for
a business to be concerned about job performance. If the terms express
real differences in the kinds of permissible justifications, there are two
possible consequences. An employer might possibly justify its policy on
the basis of either standard or might be required to satisfy both. The
Supreme Court has not addressed the question. In Griggs, Albemarle,
and Dothard, the employers attempted to justify the challenged employ-
ment policies on the basis of job performance but failed to prove any
relationship between the two. In Beazer, the Court dealt briefly and
summarily with the defendant's justification; the Court's primary con-
cern was to evaluate the plaintiff's prima facie case.1 5 2
151. Id. See Williams, supra note 14, at 690-93; Comment, supra note 2, at 918-20, for
parsing of this requirement. See also United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir.
1971).
152. To resolve the issue, one could argue that Beazer implicitly overruled Dothard. For
example, Smith, supra note 2, at 401-04, argues that evidence of alternatives can be used only to
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By defining disparate impact claims in terms of the employer's in-
terest as well as the effect of selection criteria on minority group mem-
bers, the Supreme Court has suggested that Title VII requires a balanc-
ing of those often incompatible interests. 153 In disparate impact
decisions courts need to confront the nature of this accommodation
show intentional discrimination because any other use, such as undercutting the nexus between the
policy and the employer's goals, would imply that the employer needs to prove that an employ-
ment policy is both "job-related" and a "business necessity." See also Ill. Note, supra note 2, at
207-10. For reasons already discussed, see supra text accompanying notes 85-112 & 127-34, the
Court's treatment of the defense issue in Beazer and its subsequent decision in Connecticut v. Teal,
suggest Beazer does not overrule Dothard. Rebutting this argument more directly would require
developing the distinctions between the notions of "job-relatedness" and "business necessity."
This course of argument would reify the terms, which members of the Court, in other contexts,
have cautioned against. See, e.g., Teal, 457 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court has also
cautioned against the rigid application of models of proof given the infinite variety of factual
patterns that emerge in Title VII litigation. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6
(1981). This kind of direct rebuttal would also shift the discussion away from the real issues that
need to be considered.
Clearly, the Griggs Court did not intend to limit a defendant's justification to considerations
of how well employees do their jobs. After all, a company's primary motive is maximizing profits-
accomplished in a variety of ways by pursuing a number of different policies. See, e.g., Rothschild
& Werden, Title VII and the Use of Employment Tests: An Illustration of the Limits of the Judicial
Process, I I J. LEGAL STUDIEs 261, 269-71 (1982). In this context, the Court's use of "job-related"
and "business necessity" expresses different but roughly equivalent notions. Less clear is whether
the Court's subsequent use of "business necessity" put some gloss on the showing required to
prove that an employment practice is related to job performance. For example, under Dothards
second standard, it is unclear whether an employer must show that a particular policy, as opposed
to another policy, is necessary to predict successful job performance.
Why must the employer prove more than that the employment practice is job-related, as
Dothard implies? Contrary to this implication, if the defendant can prove an employment practice
is related to job performance, that employer has met the same standard as an employer who has
formally validated a test's relationship to job performance, the burden of proof Griggs and
Albemarle set. Yet, courts often inquire into whether a challenged employment practice is neces-
sary, even if the employer's justification is that the practice is related to job performance. The
controversy in the lower federal courts is over what level of necessity defendants must show, not
whether such an inquiry is appropriate in the first place. See, e.g., Chrisner v. Complete Auto
Trans., Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1981) and discussion infra text accompanying notes
173-83; Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1276-80 (9th Cir. 1981). Cf. Comment,
supra note 2, at 933-34 (any real business purpose satisfies burden).
There is also a semantic problem lurking in the issue of the difference between job related-
ness and business necessity. Some commentators and Supreme Court opinions start from the
premise that the Griggs test. is "business necessity" and that the question of job-relatedness is
simply a version of business necessity. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977); Williams, supra note 14, at 687-89. Others start from the premise that
the test is "job-relatedness" and that business necessity may be a version of that. E.g., Smith, supra
note 2, at 401. While the resolution of this problem is not crucial in determining the relevance of
alternatives evidence, but cf 111. Note, supra note 2, at 207-10, the former view makes it easier to
understand how the question of "necessity" comes into the analysis.
153. Although a balancing approach is always subject to misuse, a statute addressing
nondiscrimination in employment almost compels balancing because of the interdependent nature
of the many legitimate interests involved. Compare Ga. Note, supra note 2, at 385 (courts must
balance the congressional commitment to equal employment opportunity with the congressional
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between an employer's interest in advancing its own legitimate business
prerogatives and minority group members' interest in equal employ-
ment opportunity.' 54 One way to determine whether an accommoda-
tion is possible is to examine alternative selection criteria that have less
adverse impact than the one actually used. The nature of the defen-
dant's burden of proof thus affects the significance of alternatives evi-
dence. If the defendant's burden is easily met, the practical effect of
showing that alternatives exist will be limited. If, on the other hand, the
scope of an employer's permissible justification is narrow, evidence of
alternatives can be important in resolving disparate impact claims.
In Griggs, the Supreme Court read the congressional purpose of
Title VII broadly, with the balance weighted toward minority group
members. The Court required that defendants show more than that the
selection procedure was commonly used, that it seemed "obviously"
related to maximizing profits, or that it was rationally related to merit,
to justify policies with an adverse impact. 15 5 The Supreme Court deci-
sions of the following decade retreated from this pro-plaintiff tilt in so-
desire to minimize interference with legitimate business prerogatives) with Comment, supra note 2,
at 917, 924-25 (no balancing because a legitimate business purpose is a complete defense).
154. Typically, the private employer's interests are in safety, efficiency and productivity.
Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Ap-
proach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 108 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note]. What is efficient, however, is
often controversial. See Fiss, supra note 126, at 253-63; Rothschild & Werden, supra note 152, at
263-65, 269-72. It is more difficult to identify the public employer's interests, which may include the
profit-maximizing motives associated with the private sector, but may extend to other intangible
concerns such as promoting a sense of political community. E.g., Village of Arlington Hts. v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (upholding the power of a predominantly
white middle class suburb to exclude a low income housing development when motivated by a
desire to protect property values and the integrity of the Village's zoning plan); Starns v. Malker-
son, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), afg mem., 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) (upholding a state univer-
sity regulation conditioning in-state tuition on one year's residence in the state); Halter v.
Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) (upholding constitutionality of state statute preventing commercial
exploitation of American flag).
Courts are, of course, not free to impose their own view of social policy. They should be
guided by Congress' intent embodied in Title VII. The trouble is that the intent is not clearly
expressed in the statute and its legislative history is similarly unrevealing. See generally Vaas, Title
VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966). See also Chamallas, supra note
15, at 323-29; Rothschild & Werden, supra note 152, at 265-69; Wilson, supra note 138, at 852-85.
Cf Cox, Substance and Process in Employment Discrimination Law: One View of the Swamp, 18
VAL. U.L. REV. 21, 95-97 (1983). As usual, the legislative history has something for everybody.
155. The defendants argued that even though its tests were not specifically related to par-
ticular jobs they increased the overall quality of the workforce, but the Supreme Court rejected this
argument. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 431-32. See also Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality
and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 263, 268 (arguing that the Supreme Court
is struggling to reduce the gross disproportion in the burdens of proof heretofore placed on
defendants as contrasted with plaintiffs).
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cial policy, with the Court rarely affirming a finding of discrimination if
the defendant put forth any defense at all. 156
Moreover, in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, the Supreme
Court cautioned the court of appeals against imposing its own notions
of how to structure business practices. The message to be drawn from
Furnco is that, within some range of legitimate judgment, employers
have discretion to determine job requirements as well as the feasibility
of alternative employment procedures.1 57 Discretion does not mean
absolute freedom, however, and the question remains how to determine
this range of legitimate discretion."5 8 The issue, in terms of the defen-
dant's justification and the existence of alternatives, is how to avoid
excessive infringement of the employer's right to structure its business
as it sees fit, and at the same time to protect the interests of minority
group members. In Connecticut v. Teal, the Supreme Court narrowed
the range by precluding the employer from choosing between validating
tests with adverse impact and structuring its employment process to
eliminate adverse impact.' 59 In so doing, the Court recognized a third
set of interests to be accommodated-the interests of individual minor-
ity group members that may conflict with the interests of the group as a
whole.
156. Ga. Note, supra note 2, at 404.
157. The fact that Furnco is a disparate treatment case, alleging intentional discrimination
in the hiring of bricklayers without clear evidence of adverse impact, is not significant for the
argument made here in the text.
158. The lower federal courts are divided on this issue. Some hold that Title VII tolerates
adverse impact on minority group members so long as the impact is incidental to criteria that
genuinely predict or significantly correlate with job performance. Others take the view that Title
VII only allows criteria with an adverse impact when forbidding them would seriously undermine
or damage the business. For a list, see Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1289.
The former view emphasizes the efficient relationship between the selection criteria and the
job while the latter inquires into the importance of the interest the employer advances. In terms of
the range of employer discretion, the former does not greatly restrict the employer's discretion,
since requiring a substantial relationship between the selection criterion and the job merely ad-
vances the employer's own interest. That is, it would be inefficient for an employer to use one
selection criterion when another is a better predictor of the kind of employee desired. See
Rothschild & Werden, supra note 152, at 263-65; Comment, supra note 2, at 924-25. The latter
view restricts employer freedom and discretion because it does not always uphold an employer's
admittedly legitimate interest in the face of what the court and the plaintiff agree is a better proce-
dure. There is a similar distinction in cases based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994-96, 1082-92 (1978).
159. Cf. Chamallas, supra note 15, at 381-83, who criticized the Court's decision in Teal
because courts ought to defer to employer choice (between validation and the bottom line) when-
ever the employer has demonstrated that it is not indifferent to equality concerns. The approach
suggested here does not apply to those situations. See also supra note 133.
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B. Factual Patterns in Disparate Impact Cases
Factual differences in disparate impact cases illustrate when and
how alternatives evidence is relevant. One can identify at least three
typical fact patterns. First, plaintiffs challenge a paper and pencil test
that defendants say predicts job performance. Second, plaintiffs chal-
lenge a nonscored, objective criterion that defendants assert is also re-
lated to job performance. Third, plaintiffs challenge an objective, non-
scored criterion that defendants argue is important for reasons
unrelated to job performance, such as economic or political self-
interest.
Depending on the nature of the employer's justification for the
practice in question, the role of alternatives evidence will vary. First,
the evidence may suggest that the employer intentionally discriminated
against plaintiffs in choosing the selection criterion. Second, evidence of
alternatives may illustrate that the relationship between the selection
criterion and the employer's purpose is not substantial enough to justify
its use in the face of its adverse impact. Third, evidence of alternatives
may suggest that the employer's interest in using a particular selection
procedure is not sufficiently important to justify its continued use. The
distinction between the relationship of the selection criterion and the
employer's purpose, on the one hand, and the importance of an em-
ployer's particular goal, on the other hand, will be illustrated further
below. In short, the distinction is similar to that in the equal protection
requirement that "classifications by gender must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives. '"6'
1. FACTUAL PATTERN #1
The by now classic fact situations in Griggs and Albemarle illus-
trate the first pattern. Plaintiffs allege that a paper and pencil test, neu-
tral in design and administration, has an adverse impact on blacks. To
justify the use of the test, defendants assert that it is job-related. The
preferred method of proving that a test is job-related is through a for-
mal validation study.' 61 In essence, this study shows that there is a rela-
160. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (emphasis added).
161. For a discussion of the intricacies of validation and the Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, see generally Booth & MacKay, supra note 2; Johnson, Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody: The Aftermath of Griggs and the Death of Employee Testing, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1239 (1976); Wilson, supra note 138; Note, The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures: Compromises and Controversies, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 605 (1979); Note, Application of
the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both Public and
Private Employers, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 505 (1973).
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tionship between performance on the test and performance on the
job.'6 ' Thus, the defendant shows that, although the test has an ad-
verse impact, the use of the test is not unlawful because it measures
abilities that direct observation shows are necessary or desirable for the
job. Although the notion of validation is relatively straightforward, it
poses a difficult, and sometimes impossible, burden for the defendant.
In general, the courts carefully scrutinize the quality of the test's devel-
opment, the quality of the test itself, and the specific use made of the
test. 163
a. Utility of alternatives
In cases falling within this first pattern, evidence of less discrimina-
tory alternatives would consist chiefly of other tests or different forms
of the same test that measure the same traits but on which minority
groups members do better. For example, plaintiffs could argue that an
oral examination would be as revealing as a written test or that a differ-
ent written test could measure the'same traits or skills as the challenged
test. 164 The significance of such evidence of less discriminatory alterna-
tives can be two-fold: the evidence could raise the inference of inten-
tional discrimination, or it could suggest the particular test is not im-
portant to the employer for the claimed purpose. The other use of the
alternatives evidence-to illustrate that the relationship between the re-
quirement and the employer's interest is not substantial enough-is not
162. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295
(1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1983)), describe three validation techniques: content valida-
tion, criterion validation, and construct validation, §§ 5(B), 14; and specify when each is appropri-
ate and how each is performed. In general, content validation begins with job analysis data and
then involves showing that the test is related to and representative of the content of the job, or in
other words, that the test is an accurate sample of the job. The classic illustration of a test that can
be content valid is a typing test for clerical workers. Criterion validation uses empirical evidence to
show that the test successfully predicts job performance and involves a statistical comparison of
test scores with job performance scores. The traits measured are, for example, good vision, hear-
ing, or, as in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), verbal ability. Construct validation is
similar to criterion validation but is used for more abstract traits, such as intelligence or verbal
fluency. In construct validation one measures the degree to which applicants have identifiable ab-
stract traits that have been statistically shown to be important to successful job performance. The
tests in Griggs would be subjected to construct validation. Although testing professionals prefer
criterion or construct validation, there are few examples of such validation efforts upheld in the
courts. In contrast, content validation is often feasible for the defendants. See, e.g., Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
163. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 93-94 (2d Cir.
1980) (an example of a court grappling with "second generation" tests, designed with the Guide-
lines' requirements in mind).
164. For example, the plaintiffs argue for oral rather than written tests in Contreras, 656
F.2d at 1285.
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relevant in these cases because successful validation, by definition,
shows the necessary relationship.165
To raise the issue of intentional discrimination, the plaintiffs could
assert that the defendant chose the written test because minority group
members would fare poorly on it. For example, the plaintiffs in Griggs
or Albemarle could have argued that the use of standardized intelli-
gence tests, rather than some other measure of ability, suggests, particu-
larly in light of the timing, that the defendants were attempting to main-
tain their previously segregated work force.
166
The other use of alternatives evidence here is to suggest that the
interest of the employer in using the particular test is not sufficiently
important. For example, the plaintiffs could argue that a test based on
preparation manuals ought to be substituted for a traditional aptitude
test. ' 67 The aptitude test may be job-related because it measures learn-
ing skills, which are important to successful job performance, but may
have an adverse impact because it reflects inadequate training minority
group members have received. The substituted test would measure
knowledge gained from materials studied during training or probation-
ary periods. Assuming this test had less adverse impact and served the
same needs as the aptitude test, the plaintiffs would argue that the exis-
tence of the new test is evidence that the use of the particular aptitude
test is not "important" or necessary to the employer's business
interests.
b. Consequences of using alternatives
In cases where defendants "validate" the job-relatedness of the
challenged test, plaintiffs rarely are able to prove intentional discrimi-
nation by showing that other tests with less adverse impact serve the
165. The primary question in cases involving validation efforts is the strength of the rela-
tionship that is necessary to support the test. Thus, validation serves the same purpose as the
second use of alternatives but under different terminology. In fact, this similarity suggests an addi-
tional reason for the expanded use of alternatives. See infra note 173. But cf Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (Court accepted validation that showed only the relation of the test to training
school, not performance on the actual job).
166. On July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII, the Duke Power Company dropped its
racial hiring restrictions but then required applicants for nonlabor jobs to pass two aptitude tests.
Later, the Company allowed present employees to transfer with either a passing score on the tests
or a high school diploma. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28. In Albemarle the Court described the valida-
tion effort as taking place "on the eve of trial." Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 411.
The plaintiffs in neither case made any argument about intentional discrimination. Because
the defendants did not prove that the tests were related to job performance, the question of pretext
did not arise.
167. The example is from Bartholet, supra note 133, at 1024-25.
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same interests of the employer. 168 Such a showing is theoretically possi-
ble since proof of job-relatedness often rests on empirical evidence that
the test is a better predictor of successful performance than a random
selection process. No doubt other tests can predict successful job per-
formance better than random selection, and some perhaps better than
the challenged test.
The infrequency with which plaintiffs are able to produce such evi-
dence may have two quite different implications for the analytical
framework of Albemarle. On the one hand, the difficulty of showing
workable alternatives to the use of a validated test supports the view
that the utility of alternatives evidence is limited. On the other hand,
because no cases exist in which the courts have determined that the
plaintiff has demonstrated acceptable alternatives to validated tests, the
Court's decision in Albemarle may indicate that plaintiff's opportunity
in rebuttal is not thus limited. It seems unlikely the Court would bother
to mention, in dicta, the possibility of proof so elusive in nature.
Using alternatives to challenge the importance of the employer's
interest in a particular test may be more fruitful. This use is based on
the implication of the Court's opinion in Dothard v. Rawlinson. In
describing the defendant's burden, the Court said that "a discrimina-
tory practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job
performance."' 69 The plaintiff would argue that the employer's burden
of proof is not met simply by showing that a test is job-related. Where a
less discriminatory alternative test exists, the employer's aptitude test is
not "necessary."
A court's willingness to impose such an additional burden depends
on its evaluation of the employer's interests. If the substitute test is as
good a predictor as the aptitude test and has less adverse impact, using
the substitute test would be consistent with the employer's own inter-
ests. If the substitute is only marginally better at predicting job per-
formance or if the cost of devising the substitute is substantial, then
requiring the substitute is not consistent with the employer's interests.
This evaluation also involves determining the level of "necessity" that
an employer must show. While some courts have articulated an abso-
lute necessity standard,' 7 1 an accommodation of the conflicting inter-
168. E.g., Conireras, 656 F.2d at 1285; Booth & MacKay, supra note 2, at 190 (no cases
where plaintiff has demonstrated acceptable alternatives to the use of validated test). Accord
Rothschild & Werden, supra note 152, at 273; Thompson & Christiansen, supra note 2, at 601.
169. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14.
170. Unless, of course, the employer's interest is to discriminate against minority group
members, or the employer has some "irrational" attachment to the challenged rule.
171. E.g., Kirby v. Colony Furniture, 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980) (business
necessity means a compelling need); Allen v. City of Mobile, 464 F. Supp. 433 (S.D. Ala. 1978)
(must show test is an absolute. necessity).
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ests of the employer and minority group members suggests a "reason-
ably necessary" standard.' 7 2
Cases falling within this first pattern most closely parallel the fac-
tual situation in Albemarle. If the defendant succeeds in validating a
challenged paper and pencil test, many of the questions that plaintiffs
can raise about the job-relatedness standard already are answered in
the defendant's favor. Thus, in cases of this kind, evidence of alterna-
tives has been of limited utility; usually the case is won or lost on the
validation issue.
2. FACTUAL PATTERN #2
The second pattern involves nonscored objective selection criteria,
such as height and weight or previous experience requirements, that the
defendant asserts are related to job performance. This pattern differs
from the first in that the challenged selection criterion is not a paper and
pencil test and the defendant is unlikely to engage in a formal validation
study to establish the criterion's job-relatedness. '73
172. E.g., Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1277; Guardians Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 109.
173. Distinguishing pattern #1 and pattern #2 on the basis of whether an employer has
formally validated the selection criterion is an empirically accurate description of factual differ-
ences in disparate impact cases. This distinction leaves unanswered the question whether Title VII
requires formal validation to justify unscored objective criteria to the same extent as required to
justify traditional tests. The primary basis for requiring validation is the Court's deference in
Griggs to the then existing EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg.
12,333 (August 1, 1970). The present Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, as
did the guidelines in Griggs, suggest validation is required in all cases where the criteria have
substantial adverse impact, because of the broad applicability of the Guidelines. See Uniform
Guidelines, supra note 11, at §§ 2B & 16Q, 43 Fed. Reg. at 38,296 & 38,308 (1978) (codified in 29
C.F.R. §§ 1607.2B, 1607.16Q (1984)). On the other hand, the Court did not defer to the EEOC's
guidelines with respect to the high school diploma requirement also challenged in Griggs. Griggs,
401 U.S. at 433 n.8. And the Uniform Guidelines allow alternate approaches for establishing job-
relatedness when a challenged selection procedure has not been validated:
When an informal or unscored selection procedure which has an adverse impact is uti-
lized, the user should eliminate the adverse impact, or modify the procedure to one which
is a formal, scored or quantified measure or combination of measures and then validate
the procedure in accord with these guidelines, or otherwise justify continued use of the
procedure in accord with Federal law.
Uniform Guidelines, supra note 11, at § 6B(l), 43 Fed. Reg. at 38,299 (August 25, 1978) (codified in
29 C.F.R. § 1607.6B(l) (1984)) (emphasis added).
Commentators and courts disagree over the necessity of validating nonscored objective cri-
teria. Compare Bartholet, supra note 133, at 989 (fundamental principles of validation apply to all
selection procedures) with Lerner, supra note 141, at 39 (formal validation is not necessary to
justify selection procedures in all cases). Compare Greenspan v. Automobile Club, 495 F. Supp.
1021, 1034 n.15 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (rejecting defendant's argument that validation is not required
to justify prior experience requirement) with League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa
Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 900-02 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that educational
requirements must be validated according to EEOC guidelines). While validation is a useful
method for proving a correlation between job performance and a selection procedure (or more
1985:1 Employee Selection Criteria
In these cases the plaintiff alleges, for example, that a minimum
height and weight requirement has an adverse impact on women, be-
cause height and weight are related to, although not determined by,
gender. Or, the plaintiff alleges that a selection criterion preferring can-
didates with previous experience has an adverse impact on blacks be-
cause blacks have been prevented from getting the necessary experi-
ence. To justify the use of the selection criteria, the defendant argues
that they are related to job performance. For example, in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, the defendants could have argued that a minimum height
and weight requirement was a useful proxy for the "appearance of
strength," which is necessary to be a successful prison guard.' 74 Simi-
likely, for showing that an assumed correlation does not exist), the technique is not inherently
superior to other forms of evidence. At most, validation represents expert testimony, but experts
can base their opinions on other information or express their opinions in other ways. The appro-
priate focus at this stage of Title VII litigation should be on what the evidence proves, and not
what kind of evidence it is.
The prevailing preference for establishing the job-relatedness of a scored pencil and paper
test-but not unscored objective criteria-through validation may be explained in several ways.
First, as stated above, the Court's deference to the EEOC's guidelines requiring validation was in
the context of the Court's discussion and interpretaton of § 703(h), which exempts "professionally
developed ability tests." The Court adopted the EEOC's construction of§ 703(h) to require that
employment tests be job-related and that employers have available data demonstrating that the
test is predictive ofjob performance. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 n.9. The Court stated that § 703(h) has
no applicability to the high school diploma requirement and imposed the burden for its justifica-
tion as a fundamental part of the nondiscrimination provisions of Title VII itself. Id.
Second, it arguably is appropriate to treat traditional paper and pencil tests with greater
suspicion and thus subject to stricter justification standards than other objective criteria. Stan-
dardized tests, especially IQ and general aptitude tests, historically have had a severe adverse im-
pact on minority group members and are unlikely to be related to the performance of the specific
jobs in question. But f. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (pre-employment
testing possesses the potential of being an effective weapon in protecting equal employment oppor-
tunity because it has a unique capacity to measure all applicants objectively on a standardized
basis).
Third, the biggest contribution of formal validation is to provide information about non-
commonsense relationships, that is, where the relationship between a certain score on an intelli-
gence or aptitude test and job abilities is not readily apparent. See Williams, supra note 14, at 691
n.290. In contrast, the resolution of the question of whether a skill or ability, once properly mea-
sured, is necessary to a particular job is not especially furthered by formal validation. For example,
few would argue that a good back is not related to a manual laborer's job performance. The fact
that validation is not especially helpful does not mean that the required relationship between a
nonscored objective criterion and the employer's purpose is any less substantial.
These explanations for the preference of validating scored pencil and paper tests are differ-
ent from the argument that the principles of validation simply do not apply to nonscored objective
criteria or that these criteria are inherently impossible to validate. These arguments are reported
but rejected by Bartholet, supra note 133, at 986, because, as she points out, validation is techni-
cally possible. The question is whether the validation technique is worth the effort.
Finally, if the defendant does engage in formal validation, there is little difference between
these cases and the cases discussed in pattern #1. There is, however, likely to be more argument
over the validation effort itself because of the views reported by Bartholet.
174. This is the argument Justice Rehnquist suggests. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 339-40
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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larly, defendants could argue that a requirement of two years truck
driving experience is a reasonable way of insuring that employees are
qualified to operate trucks on public highways, even though truck driv-
ing is a minor part of their job.' 75
a. Utility of alternatives
In cases falling within this second pattern, alternatives can serve all
three stated purposes: the evidence could raise an inference of inten-
tional discrimination; it could illustrate that the relationship between
the requirement and the employer's interest is not substantial enough to
justify the requirement's continued use; or it could suggest that the par-
ticular requirement is not especially important to the employer.
To raise the issue of intentional discrimination, plaintiffs might al-
lege that a minimum height and weight requirement was chosen over
other criteria because women generally are shorter and weigh less than
men. Thus, the plaintiff would allege that the employer knew the crite-
rion would exclude most women and chose the minimum with that re-
sult in mind. The plaintiff would argue that the necessary quality, ap-
pearance of strength, was chosen because a woman's physical
appearance does not typically connote strength. In fact, the employer
has chosen a traditionally male image to describe qualified applicants.
In such a case the plaintiffs would argue that other criteria, such as
corrections training or conspicuously armed and uniformed employees,
also would serve the employer's purposes.
The second use of less discriminatory alternatives illustrates that
the relationship between the requirement and the employer's interest is
not substantial enough to permit the continued use of the challenged
requirement. For example, again in Dothard, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that, because strength could be measured directly, it was unlikely
the employer was using the height and weight standard as a proxy for
strength. 17 6 Even if the employer had been doing so, alternative mea-
sures would have served better the employer's stated purpose. Al-
though the "appearance of strength" standard would be less susceptible
to a simple performance test, there are other alternatives to the absolute
height and weight minimum, such as individual determinations to see
who "appears" strong.
Here, alternatives are offered as evidence of the relative inefficiency
of the selection criterion used by the defendant. The determination of
175. This example is based on the facts of Chrisner v. Complete Auto Trans., Inc., 645
F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981).
176. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332.
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inefficiency is left to ordinary evidentiary standards, because the defen-
dant did not formally validate the selection criterion. If the employer
has not established through empirical evidence that meeting a mini-
mum height and weight standard makes a person a better prison guard,
the plaintiff attacks the assumption that it does. Evidence that available
alternatives serve the employer's purpose equally well or better is im-
portant in resolving this issue.17
The third use of less discriminatory alternatives suggests that the
employer's interest in using the challenged selection criterion is not suf-
ficiently important if other selection criteria would accomplish the same
goal. For example, in a case involving a requirement of two years of
truck driving experience, the plaintiff could argue that other criteria,
such as completion of truck driving school, on the job training, or a
performance test, would accomplish the employer's goal of having em-
ployees who are qualified to operate trucks on public highways. Ac-
cording to this argument, the employer's interest in using the experience
requirement is not sufficiently important to allow its continued use in
the face of its impact. Similarly, in Dothard the plaintiffs would have
argued that the employer's interest should be to hire those who actually
can maintain control, not simply those who appear to be able to do so.
Like the second use of alternatives, these arguments also are related to
the defendant's job-relatedness justification. This evidence questions,
however, the adequacy of the employer's interest in using the particular
criterion in question, rather than evaluating the relationship between
the selection criterion and the employer's purpose.
b. Consequences of using alternatives
The cases forming this pattern provide an insight into the job-
relatedness/business necessity controversy, particularly the Supreme
Court's articulation of the defendant's justification in Dothard. The
Court said there that a discriminatory employment practice "must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance." Dothard
and the other cases in this second pattern differ factually only slightly
from those in the first pattern where plaintiffs challenge a paper-and-
pencil test and employers' attempt to validate it. The absence of valida-
tion attempts, however, can affect the analysis of the justification issue
and of the appropriate use of alternatives evidence. Thus, judicial in-
177. For example, in Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1382 (9th Cir. 1979), in
which female plaintiffs challenged a physical abilities test required to qualify for the Los Angeles
Police Department, the court found the fact that the police department had functioned success-
fully for five years without the challenged test indicated that the rule was not necessary to the
department's efficient operation.
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quiries into the "necessity" of a selection criterion in such cases can be
nothing more than a substitute for the showing that the defendant
would make with formal validation.
Inquiries into the "necessity" of a selection criterion can arise in
two ways. 7 8 The court could use a "necessity" test to evaluate the rela-
tionship between the criterion and good job performance. The plaintiff
might argue that although there is an apparent relationship, for exam-
ple, between height and weight and police work, the universality of the
relationship does not withstand scrutiny. Or, the plaintiff might argue
that the criterion does not necessarily advance the employer's interest.
That is, although height and weight may be tangentially related to po-
lice work, there are better, more efficient measures to ensure good job
performance. So understood, this use of alternatives should be noncon-
troversial because the consideration of alternatives serves simply to
evaluate the employer's assertions. 179
The court could use a necessity test in a second way, to evaluate the
importance of the employer's interest in using the particular selection
criterion in question. This use of alternatives does not question the em-
ployer's interest in having employees who do their jobs well; rather, it
scrutinizes the choices an employer makes in achieving that goal. For
example, a plaintiff might question the importance of possessing one
trait-height and weight-rather than another trait-education. She
178. That is, to evaluate the fit between the selection criterion and the job or to scrutinize
the employer's interest in a particular selection criterion. More so than in other patterns of cases,
these two issues are sometimes entangled, in argument or analysis, causing courts mistakenly to
reject evidence of alternatives. For example, it is not clear that the majority in Chrisner recognized
the two different reasons for inquiring into the necessity of the previous experience requirement.
For another reading of the opinion see infra text accompanying notes 210-16.
Sometimes the two issues overlap because what seems to be the "efficient" employment
decision is incorrectly identified. For example, before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-k (1982)), many employers required that
an unpaid mandatory maternity leave begin as early as possible. Plaintiffs would argue that such a
broad rule disqualified many individuals who could in fact adequately perform their jobs. The
defendant would respond that while some might be able to perform their jobs, there was no effi-
cient way to identify those individuals. Thus, a broad rule satisfied the means-ends test because it
appeared to be the least expensive way of avoiding unqualified workers. E.g., Harriss v. Pan Amer-
ican World Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980). The employer, however, simply had shifted the
cost of misjudging who is able to work onto the employees. Because the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act requires employers to treat pregnancy as another medical condition, which usually means paid
leaves, the employer has a financial incentive to devise a method for identifying those who can in
fact perform their jobs, rather than paying them not to work. Forcing the employer to internalize
the costs of its inefficient rule often educates the company to a heightened understanding of
efficiency.
179. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331-32. Accord Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633
F.2d 361, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1980) (evaluating alternatives in upholding the necessity of airline's
mandatory maternity leave for flight attendants after the thirteenth week of pregnancy as related
to job performance).
Employee Selection Criteria
might also attack the importance of measuring the existence of an ad-
mittedly job-related trait in a certain way. For example, an employer
who wants healthy employees requiring applicants to run five kilome-
ters in under thirty minutes. Or, the plaintiff might argue that the em-
ployer defined good job performance too narrowly: a successful class-
room teacher is one about whom there are few complaints.
Using the necessity test in this second way is controversial because
it intrudes on the employer's autonomy to structure its selection pro-
cess.1 80 For example, rather than requiring applicants to run five kilo-
meters in under thirty minutes, the employer might be required to rely
on certificates from physicians. But an employer's right to resist such
intrusions is not absolute; Title VII requires an accommodation with
the conflicting interests of minority group members.' 8 1
A plaintiff's success in using evidence of alternatives to undermine
a defendant's justification and the court's willingness to scrutinize the
justification in these cases also may depend on the reason for the selec-
tion criterion's adverse impact. For example, an employer may require
supervisors to have previous experience in the job to be supervised. The
plaintiff asserts that an alternate standard, such as good leadership abil-
ity, would serve the employer's interest equally well. The employer will
respond that previous experience in the supervised job is useful because
it makes the supervisor more effective.1 82 If minority group members
have been excluded from the supervised job, they will have been dis-
criminatorily denied the opportunity to gain the necessary experience.
The previous experience requirement is perceived as unfair because mi-
nority group members are excluded through no fault of their own.
Moreover, the effects of the experience requirement will continue to
place them at a disadvantage in gaining promotions. Under these facts
a court might find the employer's interest in previous experience inade-
quate, although related to job performance, given society's other inter-
ests, such as securing equal employment opportunity. In contrast, if
minority group members have not been denied the opportunity, but
have for various reasons simply failed to gain experience, the require-
ment is more reasonable. The employer's interest in preferring some
qualities over others and determining its own hiring and promotion
180. Compare Comment, supra note 2, at 924-25 (unfair to use criterion only if it is unre-
lated to efficiency) with Yale Note, supra note 154, at 113-15 (test criterion against the best alterna-
tives available to achieve the employer's stated goals).
181. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
182. The example is borrowed from Smith, supro note 2, at 401 n. 153. The plaintiff could
argue either that experience in a job, while related, does not in fact make an employee a better
supervisor of it or that even if previous experience directly fosters better job performance in the
supervisory job, the employer's interest in using experience, rather than leadership abilities, is
insufficient.
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standards is sufficient to override the impact of the requirement.'" 3 The
point is that evidence of alternatives is a useful way to address this pol-
icy question, which ought not be buried in technical questions of form.
3. FACTUAL PATTERN #3
The third pattern of cases litigated under the disparate impact the-
ory involves challenges to nonscored objective selection criteria that the
defendant asserts are justified for reasons unrelated to job performance.
This pattern is similar to the second because the challenged selection
criteria are not traditional paper and pencil tests, so the defendant is
unlikely to engage in formal validation studies to justify their use. Thus,
issues raised because of the lack of formal validation apply to this pat-
tern of cases as well. This pattern differs from the first two in that the
defendant does not attempt to justify the selection criteria as related to
or predictive ofjob performance. Instead, the defendant asserts they are
justified for other business reasons.
For example, a black plaintiff might challenge a residency require-
ment for city employees. If the city's population or work force is
predominantly white, the plaintiff will allege that the residency require-
ment has an adverse impact on blacks. To justify the requirement, the
defendant does not argue that living within the city limits makes em-
ployees better employees, but rather that the residency requirement ad-
vances other legitimate interests of the city, such as economic and polit-
ical self-interest.' 84 Similarly, a private sector employment policy that
183. Another difficult case would involve a police department's hiring requirement that
applicants have previous experience as police officers within the state. In defense of this previous
experience, the police department would argue that it eliminates the need for applicants to attend
the training academy, thereby getting new officers on the job quicker and at less cost, in addition to
being obviously job-related. If minority group members have been underrepresented in police de-
partments throughout the state, the narrowly defined previous experience requirement would con-
tinue the underrepresentation. The question is whether the police department's argument ought to
justify this narrowly defined hiring qualification.
184. In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976), the Court
upheld the constitutionality of such a residency requirement because it was not irrational or in
violation of the right to travel. Because Title VII requires different justifications for rules with an
adverse impact, McCarthy is not determinative.
The city could also argue that the residency requirement is related to employee work quality
by showing that being tied to the community, being closer to work, and being involved in the
community's future affects job performance. It would seem, however, that economic and political
self-interest is the more straightforward reason for such residency rules.
Some public employers have argued that the disparate impact theory of discrimination
should not be applicable to them because it prohibits discrimination beyond the scope of the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause. See, e.g., Beazer, 440 U.S. at 583 n.23, 584 n.25;
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323 n. 1. Alternatively, they argue that the courts should be more deferential
in evaluating a state's justification for a rule with an adverse impact. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n. 14.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the constitutionality of the disparate
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limits higher level jobs to present employees may have an adverse im-
pact if blacks are underrepresented in the employer's work force. The
employer may assert that such a scheme is legitimate because it pro-
vides career ladders or promotional opportunities for present employ-
ees, even if the previous experience is not related to or correlated with
successful performance in the higher level job.18 5
Another illustration of this factual pattern is found in Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., the case most often relied upon for the strict "business
necessity" test. 186 At issue was the validity of a seniority system that
perpetuated past racial discrimination. Seniority systems are desirable
because of the stability and predictability they provide for decisions
about employee promotions, layoffs, or transfers. They often are unre-
lated to job performance standards.' In Robinson the court reasoned
that a facially neutral seniority system violated Title VII unless justified
by an "overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is
necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. '"188
a. Utility of alternatives
Evidence of alternatives can be especially useful in cases falling
within this pattern. It can serve the same three purposes discussed in the
context of a nonscored objective criterion that is justified as related to
job performance. For example, if the city asserts support of the tax base
impact theory of discrimination as applied to states, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
1972 amendments to Title VII eliminating the exemption for public employers, in an eleventh
amendment challenge to back pay awards against a state employer under Title VII. Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103). The courts could accommodate some of the substantive concerns of a
state, by recognizing as reasonable and legitimate the different (nonprofit) interests of public em-
ployers, rather than by adopting a more lenient standard of review, in evaluating their justifica-
tions for a rule with an adverse impact.
In contrast, public employers should arguably be held to higher standards of justification.
Public employers are already regulated by the Constitution, with restraints on permissible behav-
ior not applicable to private employers. According to this view, private employers would enjoy
greater discretion in deciding which policies and interests to advance through their workforce.
185. This example is similar to the one discussed supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
In this instance, however, the defendant does not assert that experience is related to job perform-
ance, although it could do so.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
187. Line of progression seniority, in which a worker in a job lower in the line acquires the
necessary skills for jobs higher in the line, can be related to job performance standards if properly
implemented. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1974)
(explanation of line of progression). For a discussion of seniority systems and the Title VII issues
raised by them, see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A Gen-
eral Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969).
188. Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798. Robinson is used only to illustrate an employment crite-
rion not purported to measure job performance, not for its substantive conclusion about seniority
systems. See supra note 148.
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in defense of its residency rule, a city is likely to tax a nonresident's
income produced in the city to the same extent that the city taxes res-
idents' income. The existence of this alternative, the plaintiff can argue,
raises the inference of intentional discrimination.' 89 The city's real mo-
tive, according to the plaintiff, is to preserve the predominantly white
character of the city.
Second, the plaintiff could argue that the residency requirement
does not effectively serve the employer's stated interest. Assuming that
the employer's economic and political self-interest is legitimate, the
plaintiff would argue that the residency requirement does not substan-
tially advance that interest. For instance, the requirement may be pre-
mised on the notion that resident employees contribute to the economic
base of the city-spending money there, buying houses, paying prop-
erty taxes, lowering unemployment. The plaintiff would need to argue
that the defendant's assumptions are inaccurate; that is, there is no sig-
nificant difference between resident and nonresident employees in
where they spend their money-residents may rent, not buy; the re-
quirement may have no effect on the unemployment rate.
The third and most common argument under this fact pattern is
that the employer's interest apparently served by the requirement is not
sufficiently important to overcome the requirement's adverse impact.
This argument tests the scope of permissible justifications. In the case of
the residency requirement, the plaintiff would argue that the residency
rule is not sufficiently important to the city's economic and political
welfare.190 In the case of job experience, the plaintiff would argue that
providing promotional opportunities through an experience require-
ment reflects too narrow an interest to be condoned in light of the ad-
verse impact on minority group members. The plaintiff also could argue
that the requirement has too great a cost, especially if minority group
189. Such an inference is also supported by the fact that the residency requirement is at
odds with the employer's efficiency interests in hiring the best qualified workers. Because the city
does not stand to gain under the rule, the plaintiff' suggests that the defendant chose the residency
requirement because of its racial impact.
190. This argument is more persuasive if the city is Grosse Point, Michigan and the plain-
tiff is from Detroit; or the city is Beech Grove, Indiana and the plaintiff is from Indianapolis,
because of the racial composition of each city and their histories of discrimination. See, e.g.,
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838
(1980) (court of appeals upheld cross-district desegregation remedy for segregated Indianapolis
Public Schools because state Uni-Gov statute (setting up unified government for City of
Indianapolis and Marion County but excluding school districts and the cities of Beech Grove,
Speedway, Lawrence, and Southport) was tainted with racial discriminatory motive); Milliken v.
Bradley, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973), rev d, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (court of appeals ordered 53
suburban school districts to participate in the desegregation of the Detroit schools because "any
less comprehensive a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all black system
immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school systems .. ").
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members are underrepresented in the employer's workforce because of
past discrimination.
In either example, the plaintiff can use evidence of alternatives to
question the employer's interest in using a particular selection criterion.
For example, if the residency rule is premised on the notion that resi-
dent employees enhance the identity of the city as a political unit, the
plaintiff could argue that alternatives, such as giving preference to those
with substantial previous community service, serve this interest equally
well. 191 Alternatives to the job experience requirement include giving
weight, but not an absolute preference, to previous experience with the
same employer, or filling only some higher level openings through inter-
nal promotions.' 9 2 Such alternatives provide an opportunity to see if it
is possible to reformulate the employer's underlying goals to accommo-
date minority group members' interests in equal employment opportu-
nity without undercutting the employer's other legitimate interests.'
93
b. Consequences of using alternatives
This pattern of cases raises two initial questions: may an employer
justify a selection criterion with an adverse impact without regard to
job performance; and if so, how should courts evaluate these non-job-
related justifications?
In answer to the first question, the Supreme Court has intimated
that non-job-related concerns are permissible. Formulating the dispa-
rate impact theory in Griggs, the Supreme Court said:
191. Cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (Alaska's mineral income distribution plan
based on the length of residency in Alaska violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment). In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggests that a distribution plan based
on a desire to compensate citizens for prior contribution to the state is reasonable under some
circumstances, if it does not infringe "the right to travel." Id. at 72 & n.1 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
192. For example, internal promotions are common at institutions of higher education
not only for reasons of morale but also because it is less expensive to hire at the assistant professor
entry level than the full professor level. This common practice and the expectation of promotion
do not prevent the university from hiring some professors from other institutions or recognizing a
beginner's other qualifications with an entry level appointment as a full professor.
193. Reformulating the underlying goals is also seen in equal protection challenges under
the fourteenth amendment. For example, in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-19, Justice Powell's dispositive
opinion suggests that race can be a factor in admission programs for higher education institutions
if the purpose is diversity in the student body, but it cannot be a factor simply for its own sake.
Another way to accommodate Title VII's policy of nondiscrimination with policies unre-
lated to job performance is to exempt minority group members from the requirement. While this
action would further the employer's goals because some employees would satisfy the requirement,
it raises the issue of whether such a program is permissible affirmative action under the standards
suggested by United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See also supra note 133.
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The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 1 94
Although initially some lower courts read this language as limiting the
scope of permissible justifications to those that related to job perform-
ance,1 95 the better view is that the Court did not intend the job per-
formance language to limit the defendant's justification. 196 It is proba-
ble that the Court used the job performance language as an example of
what would constitute business necessity in the Griggs situation, be-
cause the employer asserted that using the test would result in better
overall job performance. 197
An interest in successful job performance, as Griggs said, is a para-
mount concern of employers, but they often have other interests as well.
Their interests in efficiency and productivity, as well as their right to
structure their businesses, may not manifest themselves in specific job
performance standards. These concerns should not automatically be
excluded as permissible justifications, although they do raise the ques-
tion of the scope of non-job-related interests that are insulated. Al-
though the Court has implied that a broader defense is permissible, it
has not explicitly articulated the scope of such a defense. 198
If selection criteria can be justified without regard to job perform-
ance, how should courts evaluate these non-job-related justifications?
Evaluation requires extrapolation from the traditional job-relatedness
standard. The job-relatedness standard itself is inappropriate because
the employer does not argue that the selection criterion is related to job
performance. Here, the issue is whether the employer's asserted inter-
194. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
195. E.g., Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
196. Wilson, supra note 138, at 850-51; Note, Employment Discrimination-Company Rule
Calling for Discharge After Several Wage Garnishments Discriminates Against Black Employees in
Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1972).
197. Duke Power Company admitted that the challenged requirements were not specifi-
cally related to particular jobs but argued that the requirement would upgrade the quality of its
workforce. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428, 434.
198. The Supreme Court considered employment policies unrelated to job performance in
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (policy to deny accumulated seniority to employ-
ees returning from mandatory maternity leave); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977) (collectively bargained seniority system that perpetuated past discrimination
against Blacks and Hispanics); General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of preg-
nancy related disabilities from an employer's disability insurance program). Since the decisions
rest on other issues, the Court did not reach the question of the nature of the defendant's justifica-
tion. See Williams, supra note 14, at 689-93.
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est, and the relationship of that interest to the criterion, satisfy a mea-
sure of appropriateness equivalent to job-relatedness. This question, in
turn, provides the plaintiff with an opportunity to use evidence of alter-
natives to undercut the defendant's justification in the same way the
plaintiff questions the justification of any nonscored selection criterion.
The plaintiff can use evidence of alternatives to suggest that the selec-
tion criterion does not, in fact, advance the employer's interest or that
the employer's interest in using the selection criterion does not reach the
necessary level of importance. 99
In using alternatives to argue that the selection criterion does not,
in fact, advance the employer's interest, the plaintiff again attacks either
the existence of the underlying relationship or the strength of the associ-
ation between the criterion and the employer's stated need. Such an
attack is possible because ordinarily the employer has not formally vali-
dated the criterion. A more obvious, common sense connection, how-
ever, often exists between the criterion and the employer's business in-
terest in cases falling within this third fact pattern, than in cases where
the defendant asserts a job performance justification. For example, a
city's residency rule appears more obviously related to its economic and
political self-interest than a height and weight requirement to police
work or than performance on a standardized intelligence test to as-
signing low level jobs in a power plant.2 0 0 But, sometimes the appar-
ently obvious relationship does not withstand scrutiny. Examining evi-
dence of alternatives to evaluate the defendant's argument in favor of a
substantial relationship is particularly useful in exposing inaccurate as-
sumptions about such relationships and their strength. 01
Even when the nexus between the employer's policy and purpose
exists, alternatives evidence can be helpful in evaluating the importance
of the employer's interest in a particular selection criterion. Consider
again the previous experience requirement. The employer can readily
establish that limiting jobs to those already internally employed will
clearly advance its interest in providing career ladders or promotional
199. For example, the real interest advanced by requiring employees to reside within the
city may be patronage; that is, to provide jobs for those who voted for the lawmakers. While a
residency rule would advance that interest and that interest is important to the city's lawmakers,
the question is whether it is a legitimate interest, occupying a place in public sector employment
similar to the notion of job-relatedness in other contexts.
200. But cf Smith v. Olin Chemical Corp., 555 F.2d 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc)
(defendant need not prove that a "good back" is related to performance on manual labor job
because it is "'patently neither artificial nor arbitrary, and is obviously related to business neces-
sity"). For a complete discussion of Smith, see 48 Miss. L.J. 1099 (1977).
201. The strictness of the test in Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798, should be understood in this
light. The court was formulating some measure equivalent to Griggs'job-relatedness test to evalu-
ate the appropriateness of seniority systems that perpetuated the effects of past discrimination.
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opportunities. Here the issue is the great cost of thus achieving the em-
ployer's goals. The employer's costs include sacrificing its own interest,
because the requirement severely limits the pool of qualified applicants
for high level jobs. Minority group members suffer the further restric-
tion of employment opportunities, for reasons unrelated to job per-
formance. With evidence of alternatives, the plaintiff argues that these
costs are too great because a more limited alternative would accomplish
a similar goal for the employer.
Using alternatives in this latter way-to argue that an employer's
selection criterion is not sufficiently important-plaintiffs must first
show that not all business reasons can justify a selection criterion with
an adverse impact. Supreme Court decisions involving employment
practices unrelated to job performance do suggest some limitation on
the scope of a justification unrelated to job performance. In Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty,2 °2 involving an employer's policy of denying accumu-
lated seniority to employees returning to work from mandatory mater-
nity leave, the Court analyzed the policy using the disparate impact
theory. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated "If a company's
business necessitates the adoption of particular leave policies,. .. Title
VII is not violated ... . However, "since there was no proof of
any business necessity adduced with respect to the policies in ques-
tion,"2 4 the Court did not analyze the scope of the defense.2 5
A simple statement of the business necessity standard indicates
that, whenever the plaintiff shows that alternatives can serve the same
interests of the employer, the criterion sought to be justified cannot be a
necessity. By definition, one policy is not necessary if its objectives can
be accomplished by an alternate policy. This simple statement obscures,
however, the inquiries necessary to apply the standard fairly: (1) Is the
alternative "available" in terms of feasibility and cost to the employer?
(2) Will the alternative accomplish the same goal? (3) How narrowly
can the employer define its goal? (4) How much freedom does the Court
or the plaintiff have to recast the employer's stated interest?
In a footnote in Satty, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the employer's
policy of denying accumulated seniority to employees might easily con-
flict with the employer's own economic and efficiency interests, since
inexperienced employees are favored over experienced ones.2 °6 This
observation suggests that whenever an employment policy does not
serve the employer's economic and efficiency interests, as understood by
202. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
203. Id. at 143.
204. Id.
205. See supra note 198.
206. Satty, 434 U.S. at 143 n.5.
Employee Selection Criteria
the Court, it is not a business necessity. An employer can be expected to
argue that it has the discretion to advance one interest (discouraging
employees on certain kinds of leave from returning to work) over an-
other (experienced employees preferred over inexperienced employees).
This assertion of discretion requires the defendant to articulate fully the
conflicting interests and thus expose them to judicial scrutiny.
In direct contrast to the view that alternatives always defeat a se-
lection criterion unrelated to job performance, some commentators ar-
gue that any genuine business purpose should be sufficient to justify a
selection criterion with an adverse impact.2"' Neither extreme is ad-
vanced here. The business necessity standard seeks to accommodate the
employer's and the minority group member's conflicting interests. Evi-
dence of alternatives is extremely relevant in striking the balance. Ex-
amining alternatives is an effective way to identify policy choices and to
evaluate their costs. The contrary view, that evidence of alternatives is
limited to proving intentional discrimination, is not only an inaccurate
view of the disparate impact theory but also risks inadequate considera-
tion of fundamental issues of social policy.
III. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH APPLIED: RECONCILING APPARENTLY
INCONSISTENT DECISIONS
The three factual patterns examined in Part II are not offered as
absolutes. In specific cases the plaintiff might challenge more than one
kind of selection criterion or the defendant might seek to justify a crite-
rion as related to both job performance and "business necessity." Or, a
case might present a variation on one of these factual patterns. For
example, an employer might justify requiring a supervisor to have pre-
vious experience in the job to be supervised because it encourages hard
work in the supervised job, or enhances employee morale. The purpose
is not to judge performance in the job for which experience is required
and it differs from providing promotional opportunities. Still, recogniz-
ing the basic factual patterns of disparate impact cases illustrates the
different defenses asserted and thus the different uses of alternatives
evidence.
These differences account for some of the apparent inconsistencies
in lower federal court decisions involving the disparate impact theory.
While some courts and commentators view the court of appeals' deci-
sions as inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrine,"' some of the dif-
207. E.g., Comment, supra note 2, at 923-32.
208. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 154, at 85; Comment, supra note 2, at 933-34; Ill. Note,
supra note 2, at 203-07. See also Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981);
Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981).
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ferences reflect the varying factual patterns of disparate impact chal-
lenges.2 °9 In fact, a close reading of several recent lower court cases
shows that the lower federal courts are grappling with the very issues
the Supreme Court has avoided.
In Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit,2 10 the court took what ap-
peared to be a broad view of "business necessity" but in fact suggested
that the employer would be liable if its employment policy did not ad-
vance sufficiently its job performance goals. There, a female plaintiff
had challenged the employer's requirement that "yard employees" have
two years of truck driving experience z.2 ' The employer's business in-
volved transporting new automobiles by tractor-trailer from the manu-
facturer to dealers across the country. Yard employees worked at the
employer's terminal and inspected cars, assigned them identification
numbers, drove them to a loading area, and loaded them onto the trac-
tor-trailers. The job occasionally required rearranging tractor-trailers
at the terminal or using public highways to drive them to an overflow
lot. The district court concluded that the adverse impact of the two year
requirement was unjustified because the employer had required experi-
ence for only a brief time, and did not require it at the time of the
trial.2 1 2
The court of appeals reversed the lower court on the justification
issue. According to the majority, the district court had rejected the busi-
ness necessity defense solely because the company had not shown the
unavailability of alternative hiring procedures that would have less ad-
verse impact on female applicants .2 1 3 The court of appeals said that the
plaintiff bears the burden of affirmatively proving the existence of alter-
natives with less adverse impact, that the defendant must prove that the
requirement "substantially promote[s] the proficient operation of the
business," and that the business necessity defense entails considerations
which are a function of the job's demands.2 t 4
209. But see NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (not only does
plaintiff bear the burden of persuasion on the alternatives issue but also on the issue of business
necessity or job-relatedness) discussed supra note 84. See also Smith, supra note 2, at 403.
210. 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981).
211. Prospective employees could substitute truck driving school for the experience re-
quirement. Id. at 1256.
212. Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 481, 483
(E.D. Mich. 1978). The employer instituted the new requirement in part at the request of the union
who sought to avoid layoffs of yard employees who could not transfer to truck driving positions
because they were not qualified. The company abandoned the experience requirement during a
wildcat strike and did not revive the policy after the strike was over. Chrisner, 645 F.2d at 1256.
213. Chrisner, 645 F.2d at 1260. The dissent disputes the characterization of the district
court's action. Id. at 1264.
214. Id. at 1262.
Employee Selection Criteria
In remanding the case, the court suggested several factors to con-
sider in deciding whether the plaintiff sustained her burden in proving
the existence of alternatives, but did not suggest that the factors must
add up to a finding of intentional discrimination."' 5 Instead, the factors
might show that truckdriving was not an important or essential func-
tion of the job and, therefore, that the two year experience requirement
was not substantially related to job performance. Thus, in a case where
the defendant has not formally validated the requirement, the plaintiff
could use evidence of alternatives to argue that the relationship was not
substantial enough to justify the adverse impact of the requirement. In
discussing the importance of the employer's interest, the court did not
suggest that job performance was an insufficient interest but rather that
the district court should consider how important experience in truck
driving was to the successful performance of yard employees' work. 16
Similarly, in Contreras v. City of Los Angeles,2 1 7 the court took
what appeared to be a broad view of business necessity, but in fact, it
applied the narrow prevailing standards to justify a paper and pencil
test. In Contreras, the plaintiff alleged that an auditor's examination
unlawfully discriminated against Hispanic applicants.2" 8 Deciding that
the plaintiff's evidence of statistical disparities established a prima facie
case, the court of appeals turned to the question of the defendant's bur-
den. The question, the court said, is: "[W]hat must an employer show to
meet its burden of proving that pre-employment tests, having a dispro-
portionate, adverse impact on a racial minority, are sufficiently justified
by business need to survive a Title VII challenge?" 2 9 The court con-
cluded that tests with an adverse impact are impermissible unless
"shown, by professionally accepted methods, to be predictive of or sig-
nificantly correlated with important elements of work behavior that
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are
being evaluated." 22 According to the district court and a majority of
the court of appeals, the defendant met this burden.221
215. Id. at 1263.
216. Thus the case fits within pattern #2, discussed supra text accompanying notes 173-83,
and evidence of alternatives is used to argue that the means/end relationship suggested by the
defendant is not substantial, similar to the Supreme Court's use of alternatives in Dothard, 433
U.S. at 331-32.
217. 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981).
218. The plaintiffs also alleged that the accountant's examination unlawfully discrimi-
nated but could not show that the test had a substantial adverse impact on Hispanic applicants. Id.
at 1274.
219. Id. at 1276.
220. Id. at 1280.
221. The dissent disputes this characterization of the evidence. Id. at 1294-95 (Tang, J.,
dissenting).
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In reaching this unsurprising conclusion, the majority found it nec-
essary to harmonize the ninth circuit's previous decision in Blake v. City
of Los Angeles222 with its other business necessity defense precedents.
In Blake, female plaintiffs challenged the validity of the Los Angeles
Police Department's minimum height standard and its physical ability
test. In reversing the district court's award of summary judgment for
the defendant, the court in Blake stated that the employer must show
that the selection devices are "so closely job related that their use was
justified by business necessity." '22 3 At most, the defendant had shown,
and the district court had accepted, a mere rational relationship be-
tween the height requirement and police duties. The plaintiff in
Contreras argued that this language in Blake meant that the business
necessity defense required more than showing that a selection criterion
is important to successful job performance. The Contreras court ac-
cepted the plaintiff's argument but then rejected Blake as a precedent.
Thus, one could characterize the Contreras decision as taking a broad
view of business necessity: the court refused to require the defendant to
prove more than that the auditor's test accurately predicted or corre-
lated with important elements of work behavior.
It would be a mistake to do so. The majority and the plaintiff in
Contreras failed to understand the factual differences between their case
and Blake. The plaintiffs in Blake argued, and the court of appeals there
agreed, that the defendant had not met its burden of showing that there
was a substantial relationship between the selection device and success-
ful performance as a police officer. The defendant had defined its inter-
est in terms of job performance and the plaintiffs introduced evidence of
alternatives to convince the court that the height requirement was not
related to job performance. In contrast, the question in Contreras was
the validity of a paper and pencil test. By requiring rigorous efforts to
establish the test's validity, the court did not adopt a relaxed standard
of justification.224
Finally, in Wright v. Olin Corporation, the court took what ap-
peared to be a narrow view of "business necessity." In fact, the court
extrapolated appropriately from the job-relatedness justification in a
case involving an employment policy unrelated to job performance.
222. 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
223. Id. at 1379.
224. Thus, Contreras fits within pattern #1, discussed supra text accompanying notes 161-
72, and evidence of alternatives is used to argue that the defendant's interest in using the test is not
important. As discussed, the court's willingness to accept the plaintiff's argument must depend on
the efficiency of the alternative, which the plaintiff did not show. Blake involved non-paper and
pencil tests that the defendant attempted but failed to validate. Blake, 595 F.2d at 1380-83.
225. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
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Wright is a rare case in which the court expressly dealt with the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of the disparate impact and disparate treatment the-
ories of liability as well as the implications of Albemarle and Beazer for
the significance of alternatives evidence. The plaintiffs challenged the
employer's "fetal vulnerability" policy that restricted female access to
jobs requiring contact with toxic chemicals.226 The district court ana-
lyzed the issue under the disparate treatment theory and held that the
program was justified by sound medical evidence, and was instituted
without intent to discriminate on the basis of sex. 227 The court of ap-
peals reversed and remanded, finding the issue best analyzed under the
disparate impact theory.
The court of appeals announced several principles to guide the dis-
trict court's decision on remand. First, although providing workplace
safety is in general a matter of business necessity, this interest does not
establish in a particular case that a specific safety-related measure is
sufficiently compelling to override conflicting private interests protected
by Title VII. Second, the business necessity defense cannot be estab-
lished by proof that the employer subjectively and in good faith be-
lieved the employment policy was necessary and effective. Instead, inde-
pendent, objective evidence is required. Third, the plaintiff may
introduce evidence of alternatives to show either that the policy is in
fact a pretext for intentional discrimination or that the specific "fetal
vulnerability" program was "unnecessary overkill" in light of the
defendant's purpose.228 The court thus was willing to support a broad
range of employer discretion, including defining its legitimate interest to
encompass protecting the unborn. In evaluating the choices actually
made, the court required objective evidence to support the effectiveness
of the particular "fetal vulnerability" program and adequate considera-
tion of alternatives with less impact.229
These three cases illustrate several points: first, the usefulness of
alternatives evidence in determining liability under the disparate impact
theory; second, the way evidence of alternatives can be used to show
intentional discrimination, to measure means-ends relationships, or to
evaluate the utility of an employer's scheme; third, the inquiry into the
existence of alternatives need not involve excessive infringement of an
226. The plaintiffs also alleged race and gender discrimination in recruitment, hiring, job
assignments and classifications, promotion, terminations, re-employment and its seniority system.
The district court found in favor of the defendants on all counts. The court of appeals affirmed,
except for the fetal vulnerability policy. Id. at 1176.
227. Id. at 1182-83.
228. Id. at 1191.
229. Thus, Wright fits within pattern #3, discussed supra text accompanying notes 184-
211, and the court suggests evidence of alternatives can be used to argue that the means/end rela-
tionship is not substantial enough or that the employer's underlying goals can be reformulated.
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employer's range of legitimate judgment. These courts agreed that evi-
dence of alternatives is relevant to liability determinations. The results
differ, however, because of the courts' willingness to strike a balance
between the competing interests of the employer and minority group
members.
In contrast, the Supreme Court's treatment of these issues in New
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer is troubling.2 3 For example, it is
unclear whether the defendant argued that its blanket exclusion for all
methadone users was justified for job performance reasons or by "busi-
ness necessity." If the employer asserted that the blanket exclusion was
related to employees' job performance, the Court merely presumed that
the nexus existed. The Court accepted this assertion without requiring
any supporting evidence, let alone evidence approximating the more
technical validation process. However, like the residency and previous
experience requirements discussed in Part II, there is a common sense
connection between job performance and current methadone use. If the
rule applied to past methadone users, the connection would be less ob-
vious, but the Court did not consider the validity of the rule as it ap-
plied to past users. 23' To the extent that the blanket exclusion denied
jobs to methadone users who were capable of successful job perform-
ance, the employer was faced with a conflict of interests: it was ineffi-
cient to exclude from the pool those applicants who could do the work;
it also was inefficient to devise a system to permit individual determina-
tions of employability among methadone users.
On the other hand, the employer may have asserted that the blan-
ket exclusion was justified for reasons unrelated to job performance.
The Transit Authority stated that one reason for the rule was its fear of
adverse public reaction if it generally were known that the Transit
Authority employed persons with a history of drug abuse. The question
that the Court should have addressed is whether such an interest is suffi-
ciently important in the face of the adverse impact of the rule and, if so,
why. Because the Court does not speak to the issue, it does not articu-
230. See supra text accompanying notes 66-112.
231. As Justice Powell pointed out in a separate opinion, the Transit Authority's policy
also applies to former methadone users if they have not been free of methadone for at least five
years. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 594-97. The majority admitted that a policy excluding former users
would be harder to justify but limited its consideration to current users because, in its view, there
was no evidence that the Transit Authority enforced its rule more broadly. Id. at 572 n.3. Accord-
ing to the district court, people who had successfully concluded participation in a methadone
maintenance program recently would clearly be subject to the rule. Beazer, 399 F. Supp. at 1036.
What was unclear was whether the Transit Authority would enforce its rule against those who had
been free of methadone for more than five years. Id. The Court's reluctance to consider the appli-
cation of the rule in light of its potential application to former users suggests that it viewed the
defendant's justification as one of job performance.
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late the scope of such a defense or distinguish between permissible and
impermissible discriminatory tastes. 23 2 The troubling aspect of Beazer
is the Court's failure, when given the opportunity, to explain the nature
of the business necessity defense or its relation to evidence of
alternatives.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's Title VII decisions neither limit the utility of
alternative selection criteria nor suggest any reason for treating this evi-
dence differently from other kinds of nonstatistical evidence. The con-
trary view-that alternatives are relevant only to intentional discrimi-
nation-not only misreads the Court's interpretations of Title VII but
also risks ignoring fundamental factual differences among disparate im-
pact cases. The factual patterns in disparate impact cases discussed here
show that the utility of alternatives evidence differs depending on the
kind of selection criterion challenged and the employer's reason for us-
ing it. Recognizing the differences in defenses, and consequent uses of
alternatives, makes it possible to reconcile apparently inconsistent
Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions.
Bigger issues loom. The limitation of this Article's analysis is that
it concerns objective employment decisions and perhaps implies that
employers make decisions only on the basis of explicit, objective, fac-
tors. In fact, employers make judgments within a more complex system.
Real world employment decisions may not always be rational or objec-
tive. Companies may be successful in choosing employees by following
hunches, exploiting consumer concerns, or having simple good luck.
Successful employment decisions in govenment are even more serendip-
itous. The larger issues surrounding Title VII-the meaning of equality
and the nature of government regulation-remain. For example, is the
disparate impact theory appropriate for challenging extremely discre-
tionary selection procedures, involving subjective evaluations of appli-
cants or no fixed employment policies? If so, what is the nature of the
burden that the employer must bear to justify them? Such issues are
unlikely to be debated effectively, let alone resolved, while there is an
exaltation of the form of evidence over what the evidence proves. The
analysis suggested by this Article, in spite of its objective world focus, is
intended to contribute to the analytical framework in which future de-
bate can take place.
232. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14-17 (2d ed. 1971). See also
Fiss, supra note 75, at 257-63; Rothschild & Werden, supra note 152, at 263-65.
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